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Enhancing border security in support of the global ‘war against terrorism’ is very much 
in vogue these days, in particular as regards the control of air passengers. Seven years 
after 9/11, this trend is yet unbroken. While the build-up of defences occurs in most 
cases at the one-sided expense of civil liberties, the EU-Canada Agreement of 2005 is 
different: quite justly, it holds the reputation of a well-balanced instrument respecting 
the interests of citizens. Still, instead of serving as a model for future instruments, the 
Agreement rather runs the risk of being scrapped at the next possible occasion. A close 
look at the passenger name record (PNR) ‘mainstream’, as embodied by the EU-US 
branch of transatlantic relations with four Agreements rapidly succeeding between 2004 
and 2008, reveals the opposite tendency away from data protection and towards an 
unconditional tightening of controls.  
This report undertakes to examine the doubtful benefits of such an approach by 
assessing the price to pay inter alia for ‘false positive’ mismatches and other collateral 
damages, while the actual achievement of a higher degree of public security remains 
very much in the dark, mostly owing to the impossibility of making all borders 100% 
secure. As a result, no critical reason emerges for taking leave of the good practices 
established by the EU-Canada instrument. 
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TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA 
AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS 
CEPS Special Report/September 2008 
PETER HOBBING
* 
 
We just want to fly.
1 
Introduction 
The uproar is frequent at Heathrow Airport and elsewhere. Over and over again, there are new 
security measures addressing new threats: we have become accustomed to baggage prohibitions 
of all kinds in terms of scissors, miniature knives and bottled liquids. We have become used to 
standing in endless queues waiting for security checks before boarding a transatlantic plane – or 
just transiting at an intermediary stop under the constant threat of missing a connection.  
While excessive queues and similar obstructions are felt as a direct assault on our personal 
freedom, we normally show much more patience towards intrusions into our privacy. ‘Simple’ 
transmissions of airline passenger data to security services go widely unnoticed and it is mainly 
privacy commissioners and other civil liberties watchdogs who complain. It is a different story, 
though, when these intrusions are combined with significant travel delays as in the case of 
electronic travel authorisation schemes that are about to come into vogue. “Why announce travel 
intentions 72 hours in advance?” upset passengers start asking, as they wonder how the inflation 
of security measures relates to global mobility, ‘open skies’ and other liberal concepts that 
currently dominate the headlines.  
Maybe it is the price we have to pay for being able to travel within hours from one end of the 
world to the other or maybe it is attributable to the growing sense of insecurity we encounter 
after 9/11 especially in air travel. Maybe there are other reasonable explanations of why such 
obvious restrictions to our sphere of personal freedom and integrity are unavoidable.  
Data processing even where done for high-ranking security purposes is not a game without rules, 
however. It is subject to international standards as developed by the OECD and transposed into 
national law by the various member countries. The present report undertakes to check the extent 
to which the criteria in question have been respected by the legislators. Although such scrutiny – 
in view of the interests at stake – may not require any special justification, the reader may well 
question why we examine these vital issues on the basis of the 2005 EU–Canada Agreement, 
which is undoubtedly the least-contested international instrument in the field. The point is well 
taken, given that all arrangements involving the US provide for much more explosive content 
and for conflict between governments on the one side and privacy commissioners/civil liberties 
groups on the other. 
Still, we believe that EU–Canada relations on the matter of the passenger name record (PNR) 
present a highly valuable research topic providing clues to all the strategies and tools available in 
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airline security. On the one hand, the current EU–Canada Agreement stands out from the rest by 
its measured and legally balanced approach, which left it practically unchallenged from the usual 
criticism and gave it the nimbus of a model instrument. On the other hand, the 2005 Agreement 
is not for eternity: due to its sunset clause it will expire in 2009 if not positively reconfirmed in 
negotiations starting this summer. With the current ‘climate change’ and a wind definitely 
blowing in favour of tightened security, there are continued tendencies to cut back privacy 
standards. The main indicators are the recent EU border package of February 2008 with a 
number of discomforting features that seem to be taken right out of the US toolbox in border 
security; on the Canadian side, civil liberty activists are dismayed by the new ‘no flight’ 
legislation adopted last year. And beyond, there is still the US in its role of a looming giant 
setting the pace in global border control: if the US invites the Eastern European EU member 
states to join the visa waiver programme (VWP) at the price of abandoning established EU PNR 
standards, one must be aware that the winds of change might also affect the forthcoming EU–
Canada negotiations. 
It would seem all the more important that we take the opportunity to review the situation, 
underlining the advantages of the current arrangements and stressing the possible dangers of 
trying to turn back the wheel of time. 
This report proceeds in three steps, more specifically 1) retracing the metamorphosis of PNR 
airline data from a commercial facilitation device to a widely recognised tool of counter-
terrorism; 2) analysing the extent to which the current use of this tool is acceptable, especially in 
terms of privacy protection; and 3) determining the practical benefits obtained from its use. 
1.  Tip of the iceberg: PNR functions within air transport, flight security 
and border surveillance 
Airline history is that of the fastest growing transport industry: its advance from the first 
powered flight (by the Wright brothers in 1903) to the first commercial passenger flight took just 
11 years.
2 Charles Lindbergh’s transatlantic solo flight of 1927 was soon followed by 
commercial airlines crossing the Atlantic, at first via South America and Africa, with the riskier 
northern route not becoming standard until the start of World War II in 1939
3 (see Box 1). 
Box 1. Interwar developments 
In Europe as well as North America, internal services expanded considerably in the interwar years: 
with the first European airline taking up service in February 1919 (Deutsche Luft-Reederei GmbH, 
Berlin–Weimar), there were 28 mainly national airlines operating in European skies by 1939 
(Mulder, 2005). 
In the early 1930s, Canada was one of the few industrialised countries without a national airline. It 
was only in 1937 that the newly founded Trans-Canada Airlines started to provide air service linking 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (CBC, 2004). 
In the US, the number of air passengers rose between 1932 and 1938 from 474,000 to 1.2 million, but 
still represented no more than a meagre 7.6% of the long-distance train market. At the time, flying 
was still considered a privilege “limited mostly to the upper class” (US Centennial of Flight 
Commission, 2003). 
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The real airline boom occurred worldwide after World War II, when traffic increased by double-
digit rates practically every year between 1945 and 1970, while the total number of annual 
passengers skyrocketed from 9 million to 311 million (ICAO, 1970). After some slowdown in 
the 1970s owing to the first oil crisis, the pace accelerated again thanks to technical innovation 
and, most of all, deregulation and privatisation of carriers, reaching 1.2 billion passengers in 
1992 (IATA, 2007). The boom was also mirrored in the success of the transatlantic routes: rising 
steadily, the annual passenger volume between the EU and US reached 50 million in 2007, thus 
becoming the largest international air-transport market by far. And its size is expected to expand 
by another 50%, thanks to the recent EU–US open skies agreement (EurActiv, 2007; European 
Commission, 2008). Similar negotiations are underway, under the heading of ‘blue skies’, 
between the EU and Canada – equally a market with a clear upward trend.
4  
It is quite evident that the management of such a volume of traffic requires an enormous degree 
of streamlining in order to cope with the mass of passengers. While in the 1930s cooperation 
among airlines in organising networks and performing a correct repartition of airfares in case of 
multi-sector trips (revenue allocation) relied on more or less hand-knitted formulas, by 1960 the 
airline industry had to take advantage of modern information technology to ensure smooth travel 
operations in a widening market.  
The PNR system thus developed proved to be a handy formula to cast essential data elements on 
individual travellers into a concise format that could easily be exchanged not only among 
airlines but also among other organisations linked to the system. It was therefore no surprise that 
law enforcement agencies – following the rise of aircraft hijacking in the 1970s and 1980s – 
started to show a vivid interest in accessing the data that had been gathered on airline passengers. 
Despite the insistence with which security services have pursued their goal, one should not 
overestimate the importance of PNR data as an isolated element. What counts is the overall 
scenario of data sources available: only their painstaking matching with data from other sources 
such as crime or terrorism databases will lead to reliable results. 
1.1  From open skies to electronic borders: The versatile role of the PNR 
in civil aviation 
With respect to passenger data, airline history can be subdivided into roughly three phases: 1) 
the pre-electronic ‘pioneer’ age; 2) advanced technology for travel facilitation purposes; and 3) 
post-9/11, dual exploitation for travel and security purposes. 
1.1.1  PNR as an instrument of travel facilitation 
In the ‘stone ages’ of flying, the greatest achievement in travel booking (and important 
advantage over the railways as the main competitor) was seen in the fact that it could be done by 
telephone and later by telex. All the rest remained rather old-fashioned: tickets for multi-leg 
flights “consisted of a long series of paper coupons that detailed every leg of the trip” (US 
Centennial of Flight Commission, 2003). Airline staff would mark the reservation on a card and 
file it. As demand for air travel increased and schedules grew more complex, this process 
became impractical.
5  
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In 1946, the era of automated booking started with the electromechanical Reservisor installed by 
American Airlines, while tests commissioned by Trans-Canada Airlines in 1953 investigated a 
computer-based system with remote terminals. But it took until 1959 to set up the first modern 
computer reservation system (CRS), SABRE,
6 which was able to conduct reservation storage 
and retrieval operations as well as transactions involving the services provided by various 
carriers.
7 
Besides the CRS, initially created and run by the airlines themselves, there are now large global 
distribution systems (GDSs) that book and sell tickets for multiple airlines. They are typically 
used for bookings by travel agents or even travellers by means of travel websites (Internet 
gateways). There are currently the following four GDSs: Amadeus, Galileo, SABRE and 
Worldspan, whereby Amadeus is the only Europe-based one, with the others being located in the 
US.
8 
When bookings are made by airlines, travel agents or travellers, the first step is to create a file 
containing the following five items: 1) the name of the passenger(s); 2) contact details for the 
travel agent of the airline office; 3) ticketing details – either a ticket number or a ticketing time 
limit; 4) the itinerary of at least one sector, which must be the same for all passengers listed; and 
5) the name of the person making the booking.  
The PNR thus created and complemented by a unique, alpha-numeric record locator represents 
the centrepiece of the travel operation. Just like an interlocking puzzle, further elements may be 
attached to it such as additional itinerary ‘legs’, and even hotel and car reservations. If 
passengers require flight services provided by different airlines in order to reach their destination 
(‘interlining’), reservation information in the form of copies of the original ‘master’ PNR will be 
transmitted to the other airlines and stored in their respective CRS/GDS.
9 
While the abovementioned five PNR elements are considered the minimum, there is a 
considerable amount of other information mostly required by the airlines and the travel agent to 
ensure efficient travel. These include, 
•  fare details and any restrictions that may apply to the ticket;  
•  the form of payment used, as this will usually restrict any refund if the ticket is not used;  
•  further contact details, such as telephone contact numbers at a home address and intended 
destination;  
•  age details if relevant to the travel, e.g. unaccompanied children or elderly passengers 
requiring assistance;  
•  frequent flyer data;  
•  special service requests (SSRs) such as special meal requirements, seating preferences and 
other similar requests; and  
•  other special instructions (OSIs), comments that are passed on to ground staff to enable 
them to assist passengers.
10 
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7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See the article “Passenger Name Record” in Wikipedia (retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
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Designed to “facilitate easy global sharing of PNR data”, the CRS/GDS companies “function 
both as data warehouses and data aggregators, and have a relationship to travel data analogous to 
that of credit bureaus to financial data” (EPIC, 2006, p. 81). As the list of data items is just as 
evolutionary as the number of commercial branches such as hotels, car rental firms or others 
wanting to process their transactions by means of the GDS, it is no surprise that the PNR also 
arouses the interest of government agencies that look at flight operations from an entirely 
different angle.  
1.1.2  Post-9/11 developments and its precedents 
Airplanes in the air have always been a sensitive security issue: since the first days of flying, 
intelligence services have anticipated the risk of espionage carried out by foreign reconnaissance 
aircraft.
11 Even airline passengers aboard commercial airplanes could be suspected as potential 
spies, which may explain why nowadays they are still sometimes subject to photo interdiction at 
least when passing over military installations/strategic locations.  
In a second phase, the threat turned against the airplane and its passengers when hijackers took 
hostages to exercise pressure on airlines/governments in an effort to extort transportation to a 
given location, to hold the hostages for ransom or to achieve political and publicity goals, e.g. 
the release of comrades being held in prison. Hijacking operations were mostly linked to major 
political struggles such as the US–Cuban conflict in the 1950s and 1960s, the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict, separatist movements in Asia and militant underground groups in Europe (e.g. the 
hijacking of the Landshut Lufthansa plane by the Rote Armee Fraktion in 1977).
12 
In a third phase, the in-flight destruction of aircraft as well as the killing of passengers became 
the direct objective of the assailants: although the 1988 Lockerbie crash with 259 dead 
(attributed to Libyan terrorists) remains the most widely known incident, numerous attacks of a 
similar kind came before and afterwards.
13 
The landmark events of the 9/11 suicide attacks were finally characterised by a further 
escalation: in addition to annihilating the plane and passengers, the terrorists used the fuelled 
aircraft as a guided missile to destroy ground targets, the final aim being to sow fear and terror 
in the Western world rather than pursue a concrete political purpose. 
Beyond the technique of the terror assault, 9/11 also represented a landmark in terms of 
responses to the threat of hijacking: reactions resulted first in a number of technical measures 
to address the specific risks that had emerged during the events. 
Before 9/11, the recommended response was for the crew inside the airplane to obey the 
hijackers’ demands so as to safeguard the passengers and buy time; since then the policy has  
 
                                                      
11 As early as the balloon age, right after the French Revolution in 1789, the French army used the 
reconnaissance balloon l’Entreprenant to identify Austrian troop movements in the battle of Fleurus 
(1794). See the article “Surveillance aircraft” in Wikipedia (retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Surveillance_aircraft). 
12 For further examples, see the article “List of aircraft hijackings” in Wikipedia (retrieved from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_notable_aircraft_hijackings). 
13 See the article “History of Terror Attacks” in History Central (online) (retrieved from 
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been to prevent access to the cockpit and pilots. At check-in, air passengers worldwide are 
prohibited from carrying anything remotely like a bladed weapon in the passenger cabin: 
scissors, tweezers, nail files, etc.
14 
On a more general level, the events revealed a long list of security vulnerabilities in global 
transportation and border control systems (Koslowski, 2006, p. 89), especially with regard to the 
supervision/enforcement of visa and passport requirements. According to the findings, “at least 
two of the hijackers used altered passports, one…entered with a student visa but never showed 
up for class, three stayed in the US after their visa had expired, and several purchased fraudulent 
documents on the black market that primarily services illegal immigrants” (ibid.). 
In pinpointing loopholes in pre-9/11 border control systems, the US government concluded that 
PNRs (both archived and real-time) were invaluable tools for investigating and thwarting 
terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was assigned, 
through its Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the task of managing the 
collection, transfer and retention of PNRs. 
America was shocked after the events of 9/11, but wanted to show that it was able to fight back, 
react quickly and provide a reliable defence that rendered impossible similar incidents in the 
future.
15 What America sought was nothing less than a “revolution in border security”
16 – 
analogous to the revolution in military affairs of the 1990s. 
The “revolution” implied many individual measures from tightened border controls to a radical 
reorganisation of administrative structures; in view of our limited subject, we refrain from 
discussing too many details. What counts, however, is that 9/11 as well as the intended 
revolution had a direct impact on other countries, especially the allies in the near neighbourhood 
and in the transatlantic partnership. 
On 19 November 2001, the US adopted a new Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which 
requires all airlines with US-bound international flights to submit a passenger manifest 
electronically. The Act stipulates that “the carriers shall make passenger name record 
information available to the Customs Service upon request”.
17 
1.1.2.1 US–Canadian  ‘smart borders’  
The US–Canada Smart Border Declaration signed on 3 December 2001 contains in sections 7–9 
of the Action Plan thereto attached various airline-related security measures, in particular the 
sharing of advance passenger information (API) and PNR on high-risk passengers (s. 8) and the 
set-up of Joint Passenger Analysis Units (s. 9). 
The internal Canadian requirement for airlines to provide API/PNR data had been adopted 
shortly beforehand, by the new Public Safety Act of 22 November 2001.
18 Although there had 
                                                      
14 Refer to the Federal Aviation Administration rules adopted for US airports on 13 September 2001. 
Similar rules entered into force at Canadian and European airports. For the current EU situation, see the 
European Commission’s list of 16.1.04 as amended on 5.10.06 to include explosive liquids; refer also to 
Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and Council, OJ L 355/1, 30.12.2002. 
15 The DHS was assigned/expected to “manage who and what enters our homeland” (Koslowski, 2006, 
footnote 6). 
16 See R. Falkenrath, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Adviser, as cited 
by Koslowski (2006), p. 92. 
17 See the US code – Title 49, Subtitle VII, Part A, §44909, “Passenger manifests” (retrieved from 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/49/44909.html). 
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been no formal treaty commitment or request by the US, it is obvious from the overall scenario 
that Canada took this action as part of its post-9/11 solidarity and to be in compliance with the 
general standards set by the ‘senior partner’, according to a traditional pattern in US–Canadian 
relations. The same holds true for the Canada Anti-Terrorism Act adopted rapidly after 9/11 as a 
mirror image of the US Patriot Act.
19 
It should not be overlooked that Canada – although not itself a target of the September attacks – 
had already experienced its own encounter with airborne terrorism and its wider context. The 
Canadian sensitivity towards airborne risks relates to two tragic events, i.e. the bombing of Air 
India flight 182 in June 1985, which until the 9/11 events had been the single deadliest terrorist 
attack involving aircraft.
20 The attack that killed 329 persons en-route from Montreal to India 
was attributed to a group of Sikh separatists living in Canada.  
The second incident is seen as one of the most consequential cases of data mismatch in counter-
terrorist targeting: Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen of Syrian origin, spent almost a year in a 
Syrian prison cell due to false conclusions drawn from correct PNR data by the US and 
Canadian enforcement authorities. When it eventually became clear that there was no valid 
evidence against him, the Canadian government awarded Arar CAD 10.5 million (€6.9 million) 
in compensation, the highest settlement by the Canadian government in an individual human 
rights case.
21 
1.1.2.2 Transatlantic  relations (EU–US and EU–Canada) 
Post-9/11 solidarity also prevailed on the other side of the Atlantic: the EU heads of state and 
government met for an extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September just 10 days 
after the events – a sign of truly exceptional consternation. In support of the transatlantic 
partners in distress, a number of important measures were put on track such as the European 
Arrest Warrant and the Framework Decisions on terrorism and on the freezing of assets of those 
suspected as terrorists. 
Still, airline passenger data was not among the areas initially considered for cooperative action; 
much rather, the EU became concerned with it in an indirect manner. In accordance with their 
domestic legislation, since January 2003 US Customs
22 (and later the Canada Border Services 
Agency (CBSA)) has required Europe-based airlines to submit information on US-bound air 
passengers (Guild & Brouwer, 2006). While some of the companies immediately complied with 
the request – even allowing US Customs to collect the relevant data directly from the airline 
databases (CRS/GDS), others refused on the grounds that the transfer would violate EU data 
protection provisions. Essentially, “European airlines were presented with the choice of either 
breaking US laws, facing fines and potentially losing landing rights, or violating EU data 
protection laws and facing fines” (Koslowski, 2006, p. 97).  
Reacting to this threat, the European Commission started negotiations with the CBP, which 
eventually led to the conclusion of the 2004 EU–US Agreement in PNR matters.
23 The 2004 
Agreement itself rests on two vital pillars, i.e. the EU adequacy finding that the data will be 
                                                      
19 Refer to the article “Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act”, Maclean’s Magazine, 25 October 2004 (retrieved 
from http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0012675). 
20 See the article “Air India Flight 182” in Wikipedia (retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Air_India_Flight_182). 
21 For a detailed description of the case, see UK Parliament, House of Lords (2007), p. 12. 
22 This is based on the US Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 19 November 2001 and the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 14 May 2002 (EPIC, 2007). 
23 See the EU–US Agreement of May 2004 (cited in appendix I of this report). 8 | PETER HOBBING 
 
“adequately protected” in the US (‘safe harbour’ situation) and the related “Undertakings” by the 
CBP that such protection would effectively be granted.
24 
A corresponding API/PNR system was set up in Canada in 2002 under section 107.1 of the 
Customs Act (Bill C-17), with the collection of API data beginning on 7 October 2002 and that 
of PNR data on 8 July 2003.
25 Accustomed to the situation from previous experience with the 
US, the EU reacted swiftly and entered into negotiations that led to the EU–Canada Agreement 
in API/PNR matters of 3 October 2005. 
As regards EU–US relations, however, the peace did not last long; following challenge by the 
European Parliament, on 30 May 2006 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the 
Agreement for lack of legal basis.
26 Negotiations then recommenced under time pressure in order 
to avoid a legal vacuum and the same Scylla/Charybdis scenario as had existed back in 2003. 
The new Agreement signed in July 2007,
27 with hardly any improvements in comparison with its 
predecessor, is far from pleasing all the parties involved. While European privacy 
commissioners point to a long list of deficiencies in the data protection arrangements, the US is 
about to launch a new series of bilateral agreements with some of the member states that might 
weaken privacy provisions to a still greater extent.
28 
With this situation in mind, the future seems uncertain as to whether it will entail more or less 
data protection. And there are yet further factors of uncertainty: so far just a passive player in 
PNR matters, the EU might reconsider its position and adopt a more proactive role by requesting 
air passenger data for all EU-bound flights. Be it for reasons of a new approach to border 
security (European Commission, 2008) or just a retaliation measure against the US, such a 
practice would by all means reshape the entire transatlantic landscape. 
This background is all the more a good reason to consider EU–Canada relations with increased 
attention. 
1.2  PNR & co: A methodology to turn commercial records into 
investigative tools  
Airline data quite obviously exercises a strong attraction to crime and terrorism investigators as 
well as policy-makers, but one has yet to define where the attraction lies, whether this is a target 
worth going for and, finally yet importantly, how law enforcement access to and the exploitation 
of such data should best be implemented. 
First of all, one should be aware that airlines are confronted with two types of data requests that 
should not be confused: PNR (passenger name record) and API (advance passenger 
information) are often mentioned in the same breath, which is in a way understandable as both 
                                                      
24 For a detailed description of the PNR instruments, see sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this report. 
25 For details, refer to the Article 29 Working Party (2004), p. 5ff.  
26 See the Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union 
[2006] ECR-I 4721 (cited in appendix I of this report); see also subsection 3.3.2 of this report. 
27 Refer to the EU–US Agreement of 23–26 July 2007 (cited in appendix I of this report); see also 
subsection 3.3.3 of this report. 
28 See the Czech Republic–US Agreement of 26 February 2008 (cited in appendix I of this report); see 
also subsection 3.3.4 of this report. TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 9 
 
obligations concern passengers and have to be complied with before take-off. Furthermore, both 
subjects are occasionally regulated in the same legal instrument.
29 
API, however, has nothing to do with records established by airlines for their own commercial 
purposes. Although the imposed access to the PNR has frequently been characterised as a bold 
move by security agencies to jump on the bandwagon, API concerns data that airlines did not 
store previously but which they now have to collect separately for the benefit of border 
authorities. Roughly speaking, API includes all those data elements that travellers have to 
present at the border control in the destination country; API transmission resembles a pre-arrival 
manifest sent to the border authorities of the destination country.
30 In various respects, this 
represents considerable extra work and liability risks that airline associations view with some 
scepticism (ICAO, 2008). 
1.2.1  Data collection through PNR and API 
Collecting passenger data depends on the kind of mechanism concerned: the API  data 
mechanism represents nothing but a “passenger surveillance and immigration law enforcement 
function carried out by the airlines on behalf of governments” (Hasbrouck, 2007). It consists, in 
the ideal case, of data that can be directly taken from the machine-readable part of a passport 
plus the general flight-related data that are anyway in the airline computers, e.g. as required 
under Directive 2004/82/EC (Council of the European Union, 2004).
31  
The list includes the following elements that are of evident interest to investigators as they 
enable the identity of a person to be directly established: 
•  number and type of travel document used 
•  nationality 
•  full names 
•  date of birth 
•  the border-crossing point of entry into the territory of the member state(s) 
•  code of transport 
•  departure and arrival time of the transportation 
•  total number of passengers carried on that transport 
•  the initial point of embarkation. 
The current list means a relatively modest additional burden on the shoulders of airlines, but 
there are plans for extended lists that will be much more difficult to handle and are therefore 
vehemently opposed by the associations (ICAO, 2008). 
                                                      
29 Refer to the Canadian Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) programme 
based on section 107.1 of the Customs Act, Passenger Information (Customs) Regulation, para. 148(1)(d) 
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Regulation 269 and of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulation.  
30 See the article on the Lufthansa website, “API (Advance Passenger Information)” (retrieved from 
http://www.lufthansa.com/online/portal/lh/cmn/generalinfo?l=en&nodeid=1795851&cid=). 
31 It should be noted that at least two EU member states, i.e. Spain and the UK (for targeted countries), 
have started to collect API from incoming passengers while PNR collection is not yet foreseen 
(Statewatch, 2007). 10 | PETER HOBBING 
 
In comparison with API, the PNR system is a different “kettle of fish” (Statewatch, 2007); its 
added value for security purposes is not quite as obvious – which is due to the primarily 
commercial background for which it was created. The collection of PNR data has never been 
imposed by government authorities; air carriers have developed the system according to their 
own practical needs and those of travel agents and consumers in facilitating air travel and 
international bookings. This situation hampers the simple exploitation of PNR data in various 
ways: 
•  Lack of uniformity of PNR lists and airline databases 
To comply with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards, it is 
sufficient that the PNR contains the following five basic elements, just the minimum set of 
data necessary to complete a booking:
32 1) name of the passenger(s), 2) contact details for 
the travel agent of the airline office, 3) ticketing details, 4) itinerary of at least one sector 
and 5) name of the person making the booking (ICAO, 2004, p. 2). All the remaining 
fields (up to 55) have been added according to the individual needs of airlines and their 
partners (ibid., p. 3). 
The lists used by different airline CRS/GDSs may contain the same data fields but the 
fields are presented under different names and in a different order. Sometimes fields are 
split into two, or vice versa several fields are regrouped under one heading, which 
seriously hampers the smooth comparison and evaluation of records collected by the 
airlines.  
How difficult data evaluation turns out to be in this unstructured environment is 
furthermore illustrated by the striking divergence of the lists of data that governments 
want to collect from the airline industry. None of the lists attached to the four EU 
instruments so far existing/proposed in PNR matters (the 2004 EU–US Agreement, the 
2005 EU–Canada Agreement, the 2007 EU–US Agreement and the 2007 draft Framework 
Decision) are alike. 
In some cases, it is just a change of terminology, i.e. the same subject bears another label, 
whereas in others the order of subjects has been altered, which adds to the confusion in 
view of the length of the list (up to 34 items). Most of all there is the tendency to present 
shorter lists without sacrificing any content. This is particularly true for the 2007 EU–US 
Agreement, which in an (alleged) effort to comply with privacy-related criticism shortened 
the list of items from 34 to 19 – but only two data elements were effectively deleted while 
all the rest reappeared under another heading.
33  
•  Commercial orientation of the data collected 
Many fields are of a more technical nature (e.g. seat number and ticket number) and do not 
reveal any security-related features, at least not at first sight. The spontaneous interest of 
investigators will probably turn to the so-called ‘open fields’ – SSRs, OSI and ‘general 
remarks’. It is here that one would find references to special dietary preferences, health 
needs or similar elements that in turn could reveal racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or characteristics 
concerning the health or sex life of the passenger. On the other side, such sensitive data 
                                                      
32 More precisely, this is in order to make the booking compliant with the IATA Reservations Services 
Manual (see ICAO, 2004). 
33 See the detailed comparison published by Statewatch (2007), p. 6. TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 11 
 
whenever found in these fields should be seen as ‘off limits’ for security staff (see 
European Commission, 2004 with regard to the 2004 EU–US Agreement). 
So all that the PNR can possibly deliver would require a painstaking screening of the 
technical data items in the hope of establishing patterns and matches with specific 
crime/terrorism-related data collections. This aspect will be deepened under section 1.2.3 
below. 
1.2.2  Data transfer from the airline industry to security authorities: ‘Pull’ 
vs. ‘push’ 
Once again, we can see an important difference between the data systems originally designed for 
commercial purposes and those with an immediate surveillance background, such as API 
systems (APIS). While the primary enforcement/surveillance mechanisms seem all of a piece, 
the ‘tapping’ of commercial systems does not work quite as smoothly.  
For API data the state of affairs is close to that of full automation: since the data currently 
required by the ICAO standard is limited to information contained in the machine-readable zone 
of EU passports,
34 it is sufficient that the passport be scanned (‘swiped’) at the airport check-in 
counter. The data is thus immediately available for use by the advance passenger processing 
(APP) system, which will run checks against security and intelligence watch lists connected to 
the system. Also known as the ‘board/no-board’ and ‘red light/green light’ system, the APP 
transmits the data to border control agencies prior to flight departure and receives in turn a 
directive for each passenger either permitting or denying boarding (ICAO, 2004a).
35 In the case 
of Canada, the API system is PAXIS (Passenger Information System), in which the data is 
transmitted to the Canadian authorities only after the departure of the flight (ICAO, 2003). 
PNR processing proves to be more laborious and complex owing to a number of factors: as has 
been laid down in more detail above, airline PNR systems have not been conceived for security 
purposes in the first place, either in their technical architecture or in the content stored and 
processed. Furthermore, companies handling PNR data at the airline or distribution system 
(GDS) level have neither the skills nor the interest in performing the filtering of passenger data 
in favour of the security services. Especially in the early times of PNR exploitation for security 
purposes, it became almost a standard that air carriers left the filtering to the government 
authorities in charge, granting them direct access to their computers (the ‘pull’ method) rather 
than sorting out the relevant data themselves and transmitting it to the authorities (the ‘push’ 
method).
36 
In the past, US-based airlines simply gave their database passwords to US Customs, which 
allowed them to directly extract (pull) all the PNR data without previous filtering (Koslowski, 
2006, p. 97). A still greater risk lies in providing access to the departure control system, as this 
system concerns data not confined to an individual flight but comprises the entire set of data 
held by the air carrier (EPIC, 2007). 
                                                      
34 It should be noted, though, that Canada requires airlines to transmit with the API certain data elements 
that are stored in the reservation record (PNR) for the passenger concerned, especially the reservation 
record locator (ICAO, 2003). Airlines have apparently arranged to comply with this requirement (see the 
Lufthansa notice, retrieved from http://www.lufthansa.com/online/portal/lh/cmn/generalinfo?l=en& 
nodeid=1795851&cid=). 
35 The US CBP calls this process ‘AQQ’ (APIS Quick Query) leading to a “cleared” or “not cleared” 
message being sent back for each passenger (Statewatch, 2007). 
36 For details, see ICAO (2004), p. 4. 12 | PETER HOBBING 
 
The ‘pull’ method has in the meantime been recognised as being in clear violation of privacy 
rights as laid down at the international level by the OECD guidelines of 1980.
37 It is also held to 
be in violation of corresponding legislation at the national level: without going into too many 
technical details at this stage, the direct access by third parties to an entire database for the 
purpose of obtaining just a limited set of data has to be considered a breach of the established 
principles of necessity and proportionality (EDPS, 2007).
38 It is not sufficient that the foreign 
security authority (in the case of EU–US relations, the US CBP) commit themselves to deleting 
the ‘surplus’ data at a later stage. Appropriate protection of passenger interests requires that such 
data be filtered before and not after its transmission to a third country. 
If the push method has thus been identified as the only acceptable option in the transmission of 
passenger data (EDPS, 2007, para. 98), this does not exclude that its full implementation still 
faces considerable difficulties within the airline industry. There are frequent complaints that 
push systems are too expensive, whereas the pull method would involve relatively fewer 
additional expenses (ICAO, 2004, p. 4) (see Box 2) 
Box 2. Who bears the costs? 
It is stressed that the initial costs to support the pull method are relatively minor in comparison with 
the “significant initial up-front programming expense” arising from the development of a mechanism 
to positively extract data on affected flights and push the material to the requesting government 
agency. There is a consensus, though, that operating costs arise under both methods: for carriers 
operating a large number of flights in an affected market, these costs could run to “hundreds of 
thousands of dollars per year”. 
The air transport community feels that the transfer of PNR data – no matter by which method it is 
carried out – represents an intelligence gathering operation that lies solely in the interest of the state 
and not of the air carriers. Consequently, all costs associated with the operation should therefore be 
borne by the government(s) requesting the data. 
Source: ICAO (2004). 
 
Independent of what the cost situation is, one should be aware that only the push method appears 
in compliance with the privacy legislation and that those carriers continuing to use the pull 
procedure may be exposed to possible liability claims filed by passengers concerned. After years 
of discussion,
39 the EU finally accepted that member states, “together with users”, may 
contribute to the costs of more stringent security measures to protect civil aviation against acts of 
unlawful interference. In order to avoid the risk of unlawful state aids, the new Regulation of 11 
March 2008 also stresses that the subsidies “shall be directly related to the costs of providing the 
security services concerned and shall be designed to recover no more than the relevant costs 
involved” (European Commission, 2008a, Art. 5). 
                                                      
37 See OECD (1980).  
38 In terms of the OECD 1980 guidelines, proportionality and necessity are considered sub-items of data 
quality (EDPS, 2005). For further details, see section 2.1 of this report. 
39 See the European Commission’s (2006) report of 1 August, which concludes that the implementation of 
Community legislation on airport security is a task that is “typically that of a public authority” and that 
“the financing of transport security measures which form part of essential functions of the State and which 
are connected with the exercise of powers which are typically those of a public authority does not 
constitute State aid in the sense of Art. 87(1) EC Treaty” (European Commission, 2006, p. 5f.).  TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 13 
 
1.2.3  Exploitation of PNR data by security authorities  
The exploitation of the passenger data obtained represents in a way the ‘ultimate leg’ for coming 
full circle: according to risk analysis-based security concepts (as they are nowadays a common 
standard), individual findings made during routine checks or through specialised enquiries are 
not to be seen as isolated events but also as elements that might make sense in combination with 
items found elsewhere, just like pieces of a big puzzle.  
In the case of the PNR, the situation is particularly obvious: none of the data retained in such 
records would on its own reveal a specific threat or even suspicious indicators of threat. Contrary 
to the above-mentioned API data, which may produce a direct hit on a watch list and lead to a 
concrete fly/no-fly decision, the PNR has no such straightforward content.  
The more ‘discreet’ significance of the PNR holds true for simple items (seat number, date of 
reservation, etc.) just as much as for the more sensitive SSR or OSI fields that potentially reveal 
passenger preferences and other circumstances such as “won’t fly on the Jewish sabbath”, “uses 
wheelchair” (Hasbrouck, 2007). The PNR is just a small cogwheel in the big machinery of 
global security – although one should always have in mind that even small wheels may produce 
big results, if they are placed in the right environment. 
The only benefit one can expect from the PNR is therefore to produce results by running it 
against a series of data found in other border or law enforcement collections and see whether 
there are any matches. Such cross-checks are rather complicated when performed individually 
but their efficiency increases with the degree to which the system becomes automated. 
This vision of exploiting PNR data thereby involves a twofold strategy, i.e. first, it is about 
scoring a hit on the passenger in question while running his/her data against watch lists and other 
data resources, and second, it entails widening the scope of information available when this data 
is retained and stored for future checks. 
Major systems used for routinely scrutinising PNR data are discussed below.  
1.2.3.1 United  States 
The US has certainly gathered the greatest amount of experience in the automated screening of 
airline passengers. Over the years, various names have surfaced such as the Computer-Assisted 
Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), CAPPS II, Automated Targeting System (ATS) and 
most recently Secure Flight. At the same time, confusion prevails over what is really going on. 
Even experts have to admit that they know just a minimum about the features and procedures 
involved – which appears hardly surprising in view of the secretive aura surrounding the fields 
of border surveillance and counter-terrorism. It is established that the US has tested and 
employed various programmes. We also know that some of them were abandoned (CAPPS I and 
II) owing to excessive error rates, but one can just puzzle over which system is currently 
operational: it is apparently not even certain whether “ATS is a predecessor or part of the Secure 
Flight program” (Rötzer, 2007). 
CAPPS I and II  
Like all its successors, the original CAPPS (first implemented in the late 1990s)
40 served to 
target potential terrorists by checking their PNR data against the Transportation Security 
                                                      
40 It was implemented in response to terrorist threats perceived after incidents such as the explosion of 
TWA flight 800 and the Centennial Olympic Park bombing several days later in 1996 (see the article 
“Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System” in Wikipedia, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Computer_Assisted_Passenger_Prescreening_System). 14 | PETER HOBBING 
 
Administration’s (TSA) terrorism watch lists,
41 whereby passengers selected for special checks 
(so-called ‘selectees’)
42 became subject to additional luggage control to detect possible 
explosives. Other person-related checks were not foreseen. CAPPS fell into disgrace after 9/11 
when it became known that several of the suicide hijackers had actually been selected by the 
system but that the controls had not been carried out.
43 
CAPPS II, launched in 2003 with the express backing of the US Patriot Act, extended checks to 
all passengers, irrespective of whether they had checked in luggage. It was run by a government 
agency (the TSA), instead of the commercial carriers as had been the case under CAPPS I. There 
was an expanded selection of PNR data that had to be run against government records and 
furthermore private-sector databases. The result in terms of a ‘risk score’ was displayed on the 
boarding cards, whereby green meant ‘no threat’ (no additional screening), yellow ‘unknown or 
possible threat’ (additional screening) and red ‘high risk’ (no fly). CAPPS II was cancelled in the 
summer of 2004, mainly on the basis of a devastating report by the US General Accounting 
Office stating that CAPPS II had not done its homework in seven out of eight areas for which 
improvements had previously been requested (US GAO, 2004). Specific criticism was directed 
against the high error rate affecting the watch list with prominent victims such as Senator 
Edward Kennedy (EPIC, 2007a), the absolute lack of transparency as to how the list was 
established and finally the employment of doubtful private information resources. The 
passengers concerned had neither access to the data nor ways to challenge an unfavourable risk 
designation (Greenemeier, 2004). 
Automated Targeting System 
While the public still speculated about the creation of a CAPPS III system, the DHS CBP had 
already extended its ATS, originally conceived to “target ocean-going cargo containers for 
inspection”, to include travellers. Its new function was discovered only in November 2006, when 
the DHS published a “Notice of Privacy Act system of records”
44 requesting exemption from 
crucial provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (EPIC, 2007c). Again, criticism was 
overwhelming: not only were the ATS terrorist risk profiles to be “secret, unreviewable and 
maintained by the government for 40 years”, there were also technical deficiencies haunting the 
ATS even in the performance of its limited container-related tasks. These deficiencies resulted in 
low marks (“C-/D+”) in a 2006 scrutiny report by the House Homeland Security committee and 
made it appear entirely unqualified to handle a still greater amount of data (ibid.). Given that its 
techniques were considered “imprecise”, it was felt irresponsible to allow the ATS to “mine a 
vast amount of data to create a ‘risk assessment’ on hundreds of millions of people per year, a 
label that will follow them for the rest of their lives, as the data will be retained for 40 years” 
(EPIC, 2007c). 
Despite considerable system changes announced by the DHS in August 2007 (the cancellation of 
exemptions from the Privacy Act and establishment of comprehensive passenger redress 
                                                      
41 See Privacy International (2007). 
42 This relates to those found on the ‘selectee’ list administered by the TSA as opposed to the ‘no-fly’ one 
equally managed by the TSA (refer to Privacy International, 2007). 
43 See the article “Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System” in Wikipedia (retrieved from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_Assisted_Passenger_Prescreening_System). 
44 See US DHS, Office of the Secretary, Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records, Federal Register, 71, 
no. 212 (November 2, 2006) (retrieved from http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/06-9026.htm). TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 15 
 
procedures under the DHS TRIP programme),
45 the current operation of the ATS and its 
relationship to its Secure Flight counterpart largely remain in the dark. 
Secure Flight 
Almost simultaneously with the ATS announcement, the DHS presented its new Secure Flight 
programme
46 to conduct uniform prescreening of passenger information against federal 
government watch lists for domestic and international flights. In its screening routine, the Secure 
Flight programme intends to identify “suspicious indicators associated with travel behaviour” in 
passengers’ itinerary PNR data (EPIC, 2007a). Because of the numerous security vulnerabilities 
detected by government reports as early as 2006 (Privacy International, 2007) including 
“significant weaknesses” in the terrorist watch lists available,
47 it seems that the official 
operation of the Secure Flight programme will remain grounded until 2010. Public trust in the 
watch lists has also been undermined by news reports according to which air marshals were 
subject to a “quota system in reporting terrorist profiles”.
48 
Still, one cannot be sure what is really going on; reports are contradictory and it seems that under 
the auspices of secrecy, government sources avoid providing a comprehensive description of all 
the activities underway in air passenger screening. Characteristically enough, none of the reports 
dealing with the ATS wastes a word on Secure Flight and vice versa. 
1.2.3.2 Canada 
In Canada things appear less complicated, as one might easily tell from consulting the website of 
the CBSA: there is just one agency in charge (CBSA), one programme to check PNR and API 
(PAXIS) and a concise and understandable description accessible to all those interested in the 
matter.  
PAXIS 
The PAXIS system, created in 2002 in the follow-up to the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act of 18 
December 2001,
49 provides an automated risk assessment of pre-arrival data transmitted by air 
carriers to the CBSA through electronic data interchange, e-mail and the Internet (TBCS, 2005).  
In contrast to corresponding US systems, PAXIS deals with the API and PNR in absolutely the 
same manner: the API data does not even need to be transmitted before the plane departs; it is 
sufficient if the transfer takes place within 15 minutes before landing in Canada. This implies 
that Canada – at least so far – does not employ the no-fly option, i.e. to interdict, in the case of 
high-risk travellers, the boarding of the aircraft at the airport of origin. All that PAXIS does in 
                                                      
45 See US DHS, Office of the Secretary, Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated 
Targeting System, Federal Register, 72, no. 150 (August 6, 2007) (retrieved from 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/E7-15198.htm). 
46 See the US DHS Press Release of 9 August (US DHS, 2007a). 
47 See “Terrorism Watch list is Faulted for Errors” (Nakashima, 2007, p. A12) (retrieved from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/06/AR2007090601386.html). 
48 For promotion purposes, “[e]ach federal air marshal is now expected to generate at least one SDR 
[surveillance detection report on air passengers] per month”. See the Denver News article, “Marshals: 
Innocent People Placed on ‘Watch List’ to Meet Quota”, 21 July 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/9559707/detail.html). 
49 See Parliament of Canada, Bill C-36, Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) (retrieved from 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&Mode=1&Pu
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this context is a pre-arrival targeting of travellers in the sense that it recommends certain persons 
be intercepted for secondary inspection upon arrival (CBSA, 2008a). 
Technically speaking, PAXIS – on the basis of previous API/PNR data contained in the system 
– flags risk passengers with at least one risk element in their record, i.e. those “who reach at 
least one national security threat threshold” (ibid.). It is to be noted that PAXIS assigns a risk 
score to flagged passengers, but it is the national/regional risk-assessment officers who take the 
ultimate decision whether and how to conduct the secondary inspection. This certainly helps to 
avoid embarrassing errors that seem so significant with fully automated lists, as for instance in 
the US. 
Similar to the EU–Canada Agreement, the PAXIS risk assessment and targeting system has 
evoked very little concern, among the passengers, privacy authorities or non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). The most important factors for this positive appreciation may be the 
following: 
•  the absence of fully automated mechanisms such as no-fly orders in combination with 
unreliable watch lists; 
•  a common sense adjustment of the automated PAXIS risk score by the targeting specialists 
of the National Risk Assessment Centre (CBSA); 
•  full transparency of the screening/targeting procedures employed; 
•  access to redress procedures for the passengers affected;
50 and 
•  continuous improvement of the PAXIS system rather than frequent system change. 
The satisfaction rate among users and officials concerned has been exceptionally high: unlike in 
the US, there has been no outcry for reform by either passengers or government commissions, 
which would provoke a need for radical reforms.
51  
That being said, one also needs to look at another, more recent aspect of Canadian threat-
prevention that clearly attracts much less applause. 
Passenger Protect Programme (Passenger Information System of the Customs and Border 
Service)
52 
Since 18 June 2007, Canada has operated the Passenger Protect Programme with a no-fly 
mechanism as its centrepiece, very much in line with the abovementioned US examples. The 
new rules, adopted as government regulations (with no involvement of parliament!) under the 
Aeronautics Act
53 and the authority of the minister of transport, foresee the establishment of a 
no-fly list, comprising individuals who are 
a)  involved or suspected of being involved in a terrorist group and who can be reasonably 
suspected to endanger the security of any aircraft, 
b)  convicted of one or more serious and life-threatening crimes against aviation security, or 
                                                      
50 Refer to the CBSA’s Interim Memorandum D1-16-2 (CBSA, 2003). 
51 Instead, a recent evaluation study has shown that there is a high rate of approval of the 6-year old 
system among targetters at the national and regional risk assessment centres (62% and 83% approval, 
respectively) (CBSA, 2008a, p. 16f.). 
52 For a programme description, see Transport Canada (2007a). 
53 This is based on sections 4.76, 4.77 and 4.81 of the Canadian Aeronautics Act of 1985 (retrieved from 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/a-2///en). TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 17 
 
c)  convicted of one or more serious and life-threatening offences and who may attack or 
harm an air carrier, passengers or crew members. 
The list compiled by Transport Canada (with some involvement of justice, enforcement and 
intelligence services) is implemented by the airline companies, which have to report back each 
time a traveller “matches at check-in in name, date of birth and gender with someone on the list” 
(Transport Canada, 2007a). Transport Canada’s 24-hour service will in turn take an immediate 
decision on whether to issue an “emergency direction that the individual poses an immediate 
threat to aviation security and should not be permitted to board the flight”. 
As an exceptional measure of protest, the privacy commissioners of Canada adopted a joint 
resolution claiming that the new mechanism violated legal provisions and good reason in various 
respects (OPC, 2007a), through the 
•  lack of a legal basis in the Aeronautics Act for adopting such a programme; 
•  lack of adequate protection, under the current Privacy Act, against the privacy risks 
resulting from such an initiative; 
•  absence of an available safeguard against the sharing of the list with other countries; 
•  further violations of privacy rules such as collection/use/disclosure of sensitive and 
excessive personal information; secretive use of that information; lack of a legally 
enforceable right of appeal for the traveller; and 
•  indications that Transport Canada will use not only the Canadian no-fly list but also 
corresponding lists established by other countries. 
Canadian privacy commissioners consider it very disappointing that the government has not 
taken up any of the critical remarks or suggestions contained in the resolution: “The government 
did not respond except to express its commitment to the Program.”
54 It is stressed, however, that 
this is “a Transport Canada not a CBSA program”, so one should not draw any premature 
conclusion about a general change of attitude in border matters. On the other hand, it may also 
be a worrying aspect that services outside the traditional security sector engage in stringent law 
enforcement activities without being familiar with the rules and ethics of this field. 
From a European point of view, the extent to which international flights are/will be affected by 
the programme is not apparent: at least flights from and to EU destinations seem to be exempt. 
As laid down above, the EU–Canada Agreement in API/PNR matters is very clear about the 
API/PNR data – they do not have to be transmitted before departure and will be used for a 
secondary screening only, which logically excludes any no-fly option. 
1.2.4  Results expected and those obtained 
Despite the full trust and high expectations that policy-makers exhibit when introducing 
stringent measures in transport and border security, hard evidence on the positive impact of such 
initiatives is quite scarce. 
In many cases, this is rooted in the secrecy surrounding this sensitive field, which impedes the 
detailed description of individual cases. Such problems are encountered even by official 
evaluation mechanisms, e.g. the joint review undertaken in September 2005 under section 5 of 
the 2004 EU–US Agreement on PNR matters. The European Commission report on this event 
complained about the “limitations imposed on the number of records that could be accessed and 
                                                      
54 Derived from a letter by C. Baggaley, Strategic Privacy Adviser at the OPC to the author of 5 May 
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on the provision of hard copy versions of certain staff procedural guidance” (European 
Commission, 2005, p. 6).
55 Equally, Canada’s Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddard was 
disappointed to hear that the new watch list/no-fly programme was based on “practical global 
experience and risk assessment rather than specific studies”. 
It can be hoped that the forthcoming review of the EU–Canada PNR Agreement will shed some 
additional light on the working of the passenger data mechanism. 
1.2.5 Financial  considerations:  Costs/liabilities involved for airlines, 
states and passengers 
There is perfect agreement that security, together with infrastructure, open skies and the 
environment represent the biggest challenges for airlines.
56 According to the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), since the 9/11 attacks the airline industry has incurred an 
“additional $5.6 billion annually in new security costs”. And airport security fees are constantly 
rising as is shown for both European and Canadian airports.
57 
It seems accepted in general that security costs should be shared among the various parties 
concerned, i.e. they “should be borne by the State, the airport entities, air carriers, other 
responsible agencies, or users” (Art. 5 Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008),
58 whereby there is 
disagreement as to the respective size of these shares. The EU exceptionally allows state aid 
insofar as it is directly linked to security purposes (ibid.). 
As regards the airlines, the PNR costs no longer seems a subject of primary dissatisfaction; after 
initial ICAO estimates amounting to “hundreds of thousands of dollars per year” just for running 
an existing push or pull system (ICAO, 2004, p. 4), this topic no longer shows up in recent 
publications – possibly owing to established cost-cutting routines. The European Commission 
currently estimates PNR costs at €0.20 per passenger.
59 
Another way to determine the financial impact is to look at the travel industry, whose profits 
went down by 30% following the introduction of tougher security measures: according to them 
European travellers tend to turn to destinations with less cumbersome entry conditions 
(Koslowski, 2005). 
                                                      
55 Refer also to the European Parliament Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2007)0347 of 12 July 2007 on the 
PNR Agreement with the United States of America (retrieved from http://www.statewatch.org/ 
news/2007/jul/ep-pnr-resolution-jul-07.pdf). 
56 See the article by D. Grossman (2007) on comments by IATA Director General Giovanni Bisignani. 
57 In Canada, for domestic itineraries the air travellers security charge (ATSC) is currently CAD 5 one-
way up to a maximum charge of CAD 10. For trans-border itineraries, the ATSC is CAD 8/USD 7 one-
way up to a maximum charge of CAD 16/USD 14 – see the Air Canada online article “What are the 
additional charges in my fare?” (retrieved from http://www.aircanada.com/shared/en/common/flights/ 
pop_surcharge.html). 
Regular complaints are also heard in Europe, e.g. in the UK that “Heathrow’s charges should rise from 
£9.28 to £10.96 per passenger while Gatwick’s charges should rise from £4.91 to £5.48” – see the BBC 
News online article “Watchdog eyes raised airport fees”, 3 October 2007 (retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7025419.stm). 
58 Refer to European Commission (2008a). 
59 This information was provided by the European Commission (DG for Justice, Freedom and Security) on 
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2.  PNR and the wider security landscape 
As shown in the previous section, the PNR on its own cannot achieve a significant enhancement 
of airline or border security. Even within the (small) sector of screening and targeting 
passengers, the PNR needs to be embedded in a network of links to other data and human 
resources. 
2.1  Visions of a perfect border: Seamless protection and extra-territorial 
action 
This interdependence is all the more crucial when looking at security from a larger perspective: 
‘total security’ as is increasingly strived for on both sides of the Atlantic requires an interlocking 
of all tools employed in the wider context of travel and migration control. 
2.1.1  Tendencies in travel and immigration control 
The Western world finds itself ever more challenged by complying with the contradictory targets 
of a maximum of mobility on the one hand and a maximum of security on the other.  
Since border-related security in its traditional meaning – i.e. controls based on thorough and 
time-consuming physical checks – can clearly not achieve this goal, information technology and 
automation are often seen as the way out. As a sort of miracle solution, the IT approach promises 
to transform borders into insurmountable obstacles for any illegal traveller/migrant while hardly 
impeding the bona fide passenger. Besides conferring a maximum amount of checks into the 
domain of IT, biometrics and automation, the key to overall control of the territory lies in the 
achievement of a faultless entry–exit system. 
It is also part of the streamlining approach to prevent the system from being overburdened by too 
many ‘difficult’ cases awaiting clearance right on the border, mostly within the territory of the 
receiving state. This explains the tendency to ‘push out borders’ to extra-territorial locations.  
Nevertheless, one should not conceal the fact that the ‘perfect border’ as envisaged is costly in 
various respects, i.e. financial and human resources as well as sacrifices in terms of civil 
liberties. And beyond all this, there are considerable doubts about the extent to which the 
changes envisaged really deliver the results promised. US experience indicates that a border 
perfectly sealed-off at its airport entries is rather worthless as long as the ‘back doors’ along 
endless land and water borders remain wide open. So far, no one seems to possess the technical 
means to resolve the core problem of reconciling the surveillance and mobility objectives in the 
case of a voluminous, cross-border commuter community.
60 
The following remarks intend to outline major solutions proposed under the auspices of both 
‘tight and streamlined borders’ and ‘extra-territorial controls’ in order to obtain a clearer picture 
of the neighbourhood in which PNR will henceforth do its job. 
2.1.1.1  Tight but streamlined borders 
The US set the pace back in the 1990s when it introduced US-VISIT, the first “automated entry–
exit system” originally conceived for immigration purposes to detect visa over-stayers (US DHS, 
2007). The system secures the identity of the visitor by means of biometric identifiers, i.e. two 
index fingers digitally scanned and a digital photo taken at the US port of entry, which are 
entered into the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). At exit, the identity of the 
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traveller is again checked by means of comparison with the data stored in IDENT.
61 The US-
VISIT/IDENT system provides, by the way, for a far-reaching interoperability with the 
databases managed under the aegis of the DHS. Biometric exit controls are facilitated by 
automated, self-service kiosks that are integrated with the airline check-in procedures. 
The system is air-tight insofar as it includes – in principle – all travellers, no matter whether 
they are subject to visa obligations: the former privilege of the so-called ‘visa-waiver’ 
countries
62 was abandoned in 2004.
63 The only remaining exemptions from the US-VISIT 
system are valid for Canadian citizens in general and certain groups of Mexicans. 
The US does not currently employ a ‘bona fide traveller’ programme to expedite entry–exit 
control for foreigners; it is only at US consulates abroad that ‘bona fide’ applicants may find 
simplified procedures when applying for a visa (US DHS, 2006). 
Within the EU, up to now the coverage of entry–exit movements has been fragmentary: the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), the oldest border-related database system, contains data 
on certain groups of persons to be stopped at the border (e.g. persons requested for extradition, 
suspected of crime or unwanted in the territory of a member state). In its new SIS II generation, 
the system will allow identity checks on the basis of biometric information (facial photograph 
and fingerprints).
64 The Visa Information System (VIS) will hold biometric data (facial 
photograph and 10-digit fingerprints) to identify persons who have lodged a visa application 
with an EU member state (EurActiv, 2007a). And finally, EURODAC, a fingerprint database 
for identifying asylum seekers and irregular border-crossers, enables authorities to determine 
whether asylum seekers have already applied for asylum in another EU member state or have 
illegally transited through another EU member state.
65 Although the SIS II and VIS share a 
common technical platform, there is so far no interoperability between them or with EURODAC 
(Hobbing, 2007).
66 
In early 2008, the European Commission decided to reconsider the situation and presented its 
vision of a future European entry–exit system (European Commission, 2008a). On the theme of 
“the next steps”, it proposes to introduce a fully fledged entry–exit system based on  
a)  the registration, in an entry–exit database, of all non-EU nationals entering EU territory.
67 
The database would include data on the time/place of entry, the length of stay authorised 
                                                      
61 For details, see Hobbing (2007). 
62 This includes the following EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK. The only privilege 
that remains for VWP countries is that their citizens do not have to undergo the costly and time-
consuming visa application procedures at a US consulate back home. 
63 After the attempt by a UK citizen (Richard Reid) to detonate a bomb hidden in his shoe in a transatlantic 
flight, consideration was given to abandoning the VWP altogether. Instead, the US Congress decided to 
keep the VWP but subject its beneficiaries to the requirements of the US-VISIT programme (see 
Koslowski, 2005). 
64 Refer to European Commission (2005a). 
65 Based on the biometric data stored, it is the first automated fingerprint identification system in Europe 
and has been operating since 15 January 2003; refer to the European Commission’s website article 
“‘EURODAC’ system”, last updated 10 January 2008 (retrieved from http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/ 
lvb/l33081.htm). 
66 This decision was taken in 2007 when the European Parliament, for reasons of privacy protection, 
insisted on keeping the systems apart (Ludford, 2007). 
67 The requirement would at first concern foreigners admitted for a short stay of up to 3 months 
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as well as biometric data of the persons registered. In the case of ‘over-stayers’, the system 
would transmit automated alerts to the competent authorities;  
b)  the granting of a registered traveller status to low-risk travellers from non-EU countries 
who, after appropriate prescreening, could benefit from a simplified and automated border 
check; and  
c)  an automated border-control system to manage the entry–exit of both non-EU nationals 
(as far as they have the status of a registered traveller) and EU citizens. 
The reception of these ideas has been mixed, with critics notably pointing to certain 
discrepancies between the dubious alleged benefits of the monumental border-control system 
proposed and the inconveniences in terms of fundamental privacy risks associated with such 
large-scale data collection (Geyer, 2008). Most of all, it appears doubtful whether the system 
really fulfils a facilitation need, given that neither EU citizens nor non-EU nationals in 
possession of a visa face any specific difficulties at the border.
68 
2.1.1.2  Forward defence and advance checks: Controls on foreign territory 
From security-related history, we know that there have always been forward-oriented tactics in 
the sense of outpost strategies to keep possible trespassers as far away from one’s doorstep as 
possible. Sometimes these strategies involved look-out posts or listening watches to capture the 
first signs of security threats approaching. When modern border management applies forward 
tactics, it is not satisfied with just a passive monitoring of trends,
69 but wants to do a proactive 
job by possibly intercepting ‘undesirable elements’ before they actually reach the border. The 
relocation of controls may also be motivated by concepts of risk prevention, e.g. to prevent 
persons with a possible terrorist profile from boarding a plane. 
In addition, there is of course the effort to ease pressures on domestic ports of entry by 
anticipating formalities in the context of regular international travel. In order to facilitate arrival 
in the country of destination and avoid long waiting queues, there are mounting efforts to 
relocate formalities away from the border to foreign territory, often right into the country of 
origin of the traveller.  
The most common extra-territorial formality is the visa application, which must be complied 
with in the country of origin, residence or temporary stay of the applicant. The requirements are 
broadly similar for visitors (subject to visa requirements) to Canada,
70 the EU
71 or the US.
72 
                                                                                                                                                             
granted to holders of local border permits, national long-stay visa or residence permits as well as all those 
exempted from stamping (pilots, seamen of cruise ships, diplomats, etc.). 
68 For a very detailed discussion of the proposal and its apparent weaknesses, see Guild, Carrera & Geyer 
(2008). 
69 This may still have been true for the old-style drugs liaison officers stationed in the 1980s at major 
European airports. They had to observe tendencies, consult with colleagues from the host state and 
possibly assist them in interviewing travellers. 
70 See the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website article, “Visiting Canada: How to apply”, last 
updated 14 June 2007 (retrieved from http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/visit/apply-how.asp#step5). 
71 See the German Federal Foreign Office website article, “Visas for entry into Germany”, last updated 14 
May 2008 (retrieved from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/WillkommeninD/EinreiseUnd 
Aufenthalt/Visabestimmungen.html.#t6). 
72 See the US Department of State website article, “How to get a Visa” (retrieved from 
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Applications have to be submitted to their respective embassies/consulates
73 abroad. In most 
cases, a personal visit to the visa-issuing office is mandatory – only Canada leaves some 
discretion to the visa officer. 
At the same time, visa procedures take advantage of extending certain e-border formalities to the 
‘outpost’ location: during the interview, US consulates take digital fingerprints of the applicant, 
which together with all the other data will be run against watch lists (CLASS, NCIC, IBIS, etc.) 
containing criminal justice and other sensitive information. An IBIS/IDENT record for the US 
entry–exit system will then be created, which will virtually accompany the applicant during 
his/her entire travel to the US.
74 
The EU has been inspired by the US example: so far and according to Art. 48 of the VIS 
Regulation, the biometric data required for the VIS (i.e. a digital photo and 10-digit 
fingerprint)
75 is to be collected by the member states’ consulates abroad
76 and subsequently 
entered by them into the VIS database. The information will thus be available in the system for 
identification purposes, once the visa holder arrives at the external EU border (European 
Commission, 2008b). The situation would be different, however, under a possible future entry–
exit system for non-EU nationals not subject to a visa requirement: for them the necessary 
registration of biometric data would take place at the border on the occasion of their first entry 
into EU territory (European Commission, 2008a). 
A clear signal in terms of keeping unapproved foreigners at a distance is also found in the 
electronic travel authorisation (ETA) concept, already practised for years in Australia.
77 
Praised by its inventors for allowing “easy access to data on all travellers to Australia…[and 
supporting] maintenance of Australian border integrity by law enforcement and health 
authorities” (Australian Government, 2008), its introduction is now being considered on both 
sides of the Atlantic, as the “Electronic Travel Authorization” programme in the US
78 and as the 
“Electronic System of Travel Authorisation” in the EU.
79 The interesting and, at the same time, 
controversial element of ETA is that even citizens of (so far) visa-free countries could be 
subjected to some kind of advance control.  
The US in fact foresees the new mechanism just for those countries still enjoying visa-free 
travel under the VWP (US DHS, 2006a) and the EU seems attracted to the same aspect 
                                                      
73 A Schengen short-stay visa is granted to a non-EU national that allows him/her to travel in the entire 
Schengen area, and not just to the member state that issued the visa. See the EU/German instructions on 
the Schengen area in the German Federal Foreign Office website article, “The Schengen Agreement and 
the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement”, last updated 17 December 2007 (retrieved from 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/WillkommeninD/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/ 
Schengen.html). 
74 For details, see Hobbing (2007), p. 10f. 
75 See Arts. 9(5) and 9(6) of the VIS Regulation as presented in the European Parliament’s report (A6-
0194/2007) on the Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution (retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2007-0194&language=EN 
&mode=XML). 
76 The gradual establishment of biometric collection facilities at the consulates will occur according to the 
roll-out plan laid down in Art. 48 of the VIS Regulation. 
77 The ETA was introduced in 1996. Unlike ordinary visas, when an ETA is issued, no stamp or other 
documentation is added to the holder’s passport; instead, the computer-based system links the passport 
number to the ETA and is accessible by immigration officials (Australian Government, 2008). 
78 See the US DHS (2006a). 
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(European Commission, 2008a). Held by the DHS as a “continuation of the VWP, it could just 
as readily (although less photogenically) be described as online visas for all” (Lettice, 2008). 
Cheaper
80 and less cumbersome
81 than a traditional visa, it of course involves formalities 
unfamiliar to travellers who have been used to spontaneous travel decisions: “Why should 
tourists from visa-free countries announce their intentions 48 or 72 hours in advance?” (Joffe, 
2007). 
The outpost strategy also surfaces in the context of some less elegant aspects of EU border 
management. When migratory pressure increased on the southern front of the EU and the first 
African boat people arrived in Malta and the Canary Islands,
82 politicians from various countries 
excelled in ideas on how to stop the “human tragedies in the Mediterranean” combined with the 
trafficking of human beings (IRRI, 2004). First the UK (in 2003) and then Germany and Italy (in 
2004) brought up the concept of offshore solutions in terms of so-called “offshore humanitarian 
processing centres” (Helmut, 2005) that would allow examination of asylum requests in a safe-
harbour situation. Various sites were considered (Morocco, Romania and Ukraine), but the most 
concrete arrangement was achieved with Libya, which offered a camp near Tripoli for 
implementing the EU concept (ibid.). 
Overseas processing centres are not new in global refugee policy; in the 1990s, the US was using 
its facility at the Guantanamo base(!) in Cuba to process Haitians trying to make their way to the 
US by boat. The Australians employed a similar idea in the wake of the Tampa crisis in 2001, 
creating processing centres for intercepted asylum seekers on the Pacific island nations of Nauru 
and Vanuatu (IRRI, 2004). 
Although the first deportations from Italy had already started and the EU ministers of interior 
had, in principle, approved the creation of the centres, the project was abandoned towards the 
end of 2004. Besides vehement protest by human rights organisations all over Europe, the 
withdrawal was also motivated by the finding that Libya was not even a party to the Geneva 
Refugee Convention. 
Yet another variation of extra-territorial intervention exists in the posting of immigration 
control officers abroad in order to prevent travellers with false/insufficient documents from 
boarding the aircraft. This is a uniquely Canadian approach, which has been successfully 
adopted by others, to stop terrorists, criminals and other undesirables. In recent years, Canadian 
officers abroad have stopped more than 33,000 persons with false documents before they 
boarded planes for North America (FAITC, 2003). 
2.1.2  Further extra-territorial presence of control and law enforcement  
Offshore solutions are a tempting alternative to purely domestic intervention against undesirable 
impacts from abroad. In some cases, conflicts of this kind may be resolved by cooperative 
efforts together with other partners based on mutual legal or administrative assistance, but 
mostly states prefer to do the job on their own if they can, relying on their expertise and skills.  
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The most prominent example is the post-9/11 Container Security Initiative (CSI) launched in 
early 2002 with close cooperation between the US and the EU. Based on the insight that terrorist 
threats are not confined to human action but may equally involve the use of highly dangerous 
machinery/substances, as in the case of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the CSI aims at 
assisting the control of containers – which carry approximately 90% of international trade – 
outside US territory (Koslowski, 2006). 
The reasoning behind this strategy is that the detection of WMDs after arrival in a US port may 
be “too late if the device can be detonated by remote control or the container is booby-trapped to 
detonate when opened for inspection” (ibid.). A second element is the usual congestion of major 
ports, which impedes the inspection of a significant share of containers.
83 The costs involved in 
the purchase and operation of refined technology are immense as well as the funds necessary for 
running the human interface, but they are “many times outweighed by the cost to the US 
economy resulting from port closures due to the discovery or detonation of a weapon of mass 
destruction or effect” (McClure, 2007). 
The CSI agreement of 2004 (Council of the European Union, 2004a) is working smoothly to the 
satisfaction of both parties. It should be noted that the engagements are reciprocal: inspectors 
from EU member states could also be deployed to US ports, but member states have so far not 
yet made use of this option (Koslowski, 2006). 
A more controversial item is that of sky marshals accompanying international flights – although 
a closer look at existing legal provisions shows that positions are not as far apart as one might 
believe from the EU–US clash on the air security memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
currently proposed by the US to the 27 member states (Traynor, 2008). In fact, the new 
Regulation on Civil Aviation Security (European Parliament, 2008) expressly allows member 
states to authorise the deployment of “in-flight security officers” (sky marshals), provided that 
they are government officials. It seems that rather than the substance it is the context of the US 
proposal with its link to “unacceptable new PNR demands” and the pressure exercised on 
individual governments (blackmail) that throws a negative light on the whole initiative.
84 
One last instance of public authority exercised abroad is that of ‘extraordinary renditions’, i.e. 
the apprehension and extrajudicial transfer of a person from one state to another.
85 Widely 
outlawed, this practice was adopted by US intelligence services in the 1990s in order to counter 
terrorist threats more efficiently. As opposed to legal rendition, it refers to a form of rendition in 
which suspects are taken into US custody but delivered to a third-party state, often without ever 
being on American soil and without involving the rendering country’s judiciary (Geyer, 2007). 
This practice and those who have probably taken advantage of it on European soil have been 
profoundly condemned by European institutions, in particular the European Parliament.
86  
                                                      
83 Before 9/11, the inspection of 2% of containers was the normal share in major ports. Since then, this 
ratio has improved although no exact figures are given; however, the ratio of prescreening has risen to 
100% and there are now refined methods of risk assessment (refer to McClure, 2007). 
84 For further details on the proposal, see section 2.3.1 in this report on the new generation of 
commitments. 
85 Refer to Geyer (2007), p. 2. 
86 See the online article, “EU countries ignored CIA terror suspect flights, report says”, Guardian, 14 
February 2007 (retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/14/eu.usa). TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 25 
 
2.2  Legislative hotspots: Some crucial aspects in designing PNR 
mechanisms 
Clearly, the drafting of legislation on the PNR and the sensitive areas connected to it involves 
quite a number of hotspots, i.e. legal and ethical issues whose handling would require in-depth 
examination.
87 In most cases, this occurs within the regular discussion on legal and practical 
features of existing and planned instruments. 
There are, however, two items with more remote significance but which are still important for 
shaping PNR legislation in different regions of the world.  
2.2.1  Transatlantic divide in security/privacy matters: (Continental-) 
European sensitivity towards border-related privacy intrusions vs. 
(Anglo-Saxon) North American sensitivity towards internal 
intrusions (ID card issue) 
The recent clashes over complex issues such as Iraq (war or not), the right way to tackle 
terrorism (war or fight)
88 created or reaffirmed some of the well-known stereotypes of people on 
this and on the other side of the Atlantic.  
Current attitudes wrapped in catchy formulas such as ‘sensitive day-dreamers vs. tough 
cowboys’ tend to be seen as immutable facts of life, arising out of the respective national 
characters.
89 
This same scenario under the adage “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus”
90 is likely to arise anew in our current privacy subject: ‘old Europe’ with its strong 
sensitivity towards privacy intrusions by means of collecting, processing and transmitting 
passenger data
91 forms a contrast to ‘down to earth America’, proud of not showing too many 
scruples when it comes to the “critical area of law enforcement and public safety”.
92 The formula 
is catchy but it is also one-sided – given that the situation is just the other way round in a related 
area. 
                                                      
87 Typical items are e.g. 1) choice of the body in control over data selection/transfer (push vs. pull 
systems), 2) the question of who is granted access to the data, and 3) the duration of data retention. 
88 The US side emphasises the military aspects of counter-terrorism (‘war’) whereas Europeans tend to 
consider this a police-related activity. 
89 See Pipes (2002), who at the same time recalls that “differences are hardly permanent. Two centuries 
ago, when Americans acted cautiously around the tough-guy Europeans, the roles were roughly reversed.” 
90 This adage is taken from Robert Kagan’s book, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the 
New World Order, New York: Knopf, 2003. 
91 See the newest statistics, according to which 82% of European Internet users have little trust in personal 
data management over the web (Eurobarometer poll of 17 April 2008, as cited by EurActiv, 2008). As of 
15 May 2008, the European Data Protection Supervisor Peter Hustinx has warned the Google corporation 
that the expansion of its 360, full-colour Street View map service to Europe might lead to expensive 
lawsuits for privacy violation (EU Observer, 16 May 2008, retrieved from 
http://euobserver.com/9/26154/?rk=1). 
92 On the EU draft Framework Decision on data protection in police and criminal matters, Paul 
Rosenzweig, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the DHS, states, “The draft seeks to apply the same tired, 
failed standards of adequacy that it has applied in its commercial laws.  …The EU should reconsider its 
decision to apply notions of adequacy to the critical area of law enforcement and public safety. Otherwise 
the EU runs the very real risk of turning itself into a self-imposed island, isolated from the very allies it 
needs” (statement of November 2007, as cited by the Statewatch “Observatory on Data Protection in the 
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It is the merit of Rey Koslowski of the University at Albany, a well-reputed expert on border 
control and homeland security in the information age and a frequent witness in this matter at US 
Congressional hearings, to have pointed to a surprising link between the well-known toughness 
of US border policies and a less well-known inefficiency in establishing alternative control 
mechanisms within the US territory.  
For Koslowski, Europe has much less of a need for a stringent border system as EU countries 
“strictly enforce their migration laws within their countries, while there is very little internal 
enforcement within the US”.
93 This can easily be explained by the fact that in most EU member 
states, legal immigrants as well as European citizens routinely register with the police when they 
move to a new address and carry ID cards that the police may ask to see at any time. There are 
also checks at the workplace, work permits are required and enforced, and employers will be 
tightly controlled. By contrast, once migrants have crossed the border in the US they will rarely 
be stopped any more. 
In the US – as well as in practically all other common law countries – it has not been possible, 
despite several attempts by the Bush administration, to launch a halfway promising campaign in 
favour of a national ID card. Irrespective of good factual arguments (several of the 9/11 
hijackers were able to board the plane although they did not have a valid ID) the population 
traditionally rejects the concept of ID cards to such an extent that politicians seem to shrink 
away from any further attempts (see Box 3). 
Box 3. The ID card issue 
The specific ID-card sensitivity of the US population as well as other common law countries seems 
to be founded on a deep sense of mistrust towards all kinds of central authority, even their own 
governments: for some, ID cards represent an evil per se, a “symbol of a ‘papers-please’ society 
reminiscent of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia”.
† There is even suspicion over a legislative bill to 
introduce national driver’s licenses because they might “result in a national ID card that 
compromises privacy” – six US states have already rejected the federal project and it seems unlikely 
to be realised. 
† These comments are attributed to Neal Kurk, the Republican State Representative from New Hampshire in a 
USA Today article of 18 June 2007 (as reported by Frank, 2007). Similar statements are available in great 
numbers from other parts/groupings in the US and Canada. 
Source: Frank (2007). 
 
Although emotions have not seemed quite as heated as in other common law countries, Canada 
still does not possess a national ID card either (CIPPIC, 2007). Makeshift solutions in order to 
facilitate travel and other domestic affairs, e.g. to open a bank account or provide proof of 
residence include a combination of official and private documents, such as driver’s licenses, 
birth certificates and electricity bills (Munroe, 2008; CIPPIC, 2007). It is interesting to see that 
the scepticism of the Canadian public towards the national ID card also has to do with its “low 
reliability due to a high falsification risk”; surprisingly enough, they do not see the same risk 
with other official or private-sector cards (ibid.). 
The lesson to be retained would thus be that borders are not the only place to control migration 
and its negative side effects in terms of transnational crime and terrorism. While it is obvious 
that migration and crime control by means of an ID card mechanism is not everyone’s preference 
and that there are strong traditional objections to such an approach in the Anglo-Saxon/common 
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law world, international discussions should take into account that the difficulty of coming to 
grips with efficient measures against illegal migration and terrorism has to do with not just one 
but two sensitivities – evenly spread over both sides of the Atlantic! 
2.2.2  The (so far) just one-sided benefits drawn from passenger data 
When speaking about some unbalanced risk distribution in terms of sensitivities, the same may 
be true regarding the benefits drawn from the PNR and related mechanisms. 
Even though the PNR concept originally stems from the North American toolset, one might 
imagine that after so many years of intense cooperation the EU would have installed its own set-
up to take advantage of a system that runs anyway and produces data that could be retrieved with 
a simple snap of the fingers. The EU is not yet ready for it, however, even though the US has 
promised reciprocity in its Undertakings under the 2004 Agreement.
94 
So far, the EU has confined its legislative action more or less to rendering the PNR requests by 
other countries compatible with EU concepts in data protection.
95 In 2007, for the first time, the 
Commission extended its scope of reflection to include an EU scheme for exploiting PNR data. 
The Commission proposal in question is still under consideration at the Council and European 
Parliament levels. 
Although – given the current trend towards tighter security approaches in Europe – it can be 
expected that the EU PNR scheme will be operational in the not too distant future, an attentive 
observer of PNR history will have noticed another imbalance in transatlantic negotiations. 
The entire transatlantic negotiation round started in 2002 as an emergency measure when 
European airlines were confronted with the urgent choice of either facing heavy fines/loss of US 
landing rights (when not complying with the new US PNR rules)
96 or infringing EU data 
protection laws as laid down in Directive 95/46/EC.
97  
The threat of losing access to American airports has continued to accompany the transatlantic 
PNR negotiations ever since that time. One cannot exclude that certain clauses accepted by the 
EU negotiators and later on bitterly criticised by privacy commissioners would not have been 
reconsidered/renegotiated if the EU had been somewhat more at ease in these circumstances.  
The question many observers have raised with astonishment is why the EU has shown and still 
shows such unease and haste about quickly coming to terms with the US?
98 In reality, the EU is 
not at all deprived of its bargaining power, since in conjunction with the member states it could 
always retaliate by equally withdrawing landing rights to US airplanes. It has been feared, 
however, that retaliation measures of such a fundamental nature would not be understood by the 
European citizens who want – according to a somewhat suspect assumption – above all to enjoy 
continued and unimpeded travel to the US.  
                                                      
94 See para. 45 of the Undertakings of the DHS–CBP of 11 May 2004 in the Annex to Decision 
2004/535/EC (European Commission, 2004).  
95 This approach had already been adopted by the first official statement in terms of the Commission 
Communication of December 2003 (European Commission, 2003). Yet, as regards the biographic data, 
under the API scheme the Directive 2004/82/EC has authorised member states to request such data from 
airlines and run it against JHA databases such as the SIS (see Council of the European Union, 2004). 
96 See the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 14 May 2002. 
97 See European Parliament and Council of the European Union (1995). 
98 This attitude was noticed with astonishment even by the US side, e.g. by Jonathan M. Winer, former US 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State International Law Enforcement (Winer, 2006, p. 122). 28 | PETER HOBBING 
 
The same psychological mechanism plays within the closely related area of the US VWP and its 
conflict with basic features of the EU visa policy: again, the EU has adopted a somewhat half-
hearted negotiation style that handicaps the successful implementation of a confirmed EU policy 
position.  
According to the solidarity provision of Art. 1(4) Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001,
99 member 
states exposed to a visa requirement by a non-EU country may invoke the solidarity of all the 
others to the effect of introducing a general EU visa requirement for the citizens of that state in 
return. When this situation occurred in 2004 for most of the new EU member states, Brussels 
hesitated to go beyond verbal protestations towards the US delegation, while simultaneously 
discouraging the member states concerned from making use of the solidarity clause.
100 It also 
seems that in this case the maintenance of a doubtful status quo was more important than 
defending accomplished EU positions. The central argument was again that the European public 
would not understand/approve the use of such a sharp retaliation measure.  
It is certain that this strategy did not pay off: neither did the US honour the modest EU approach 
of not putting at risk the continuity of transatlantic travel, nor did the member states concerned 
forever want to tolerate such a disadvantaged situation. The consequences became visible in 
early 2008 when the US announced bilateral negotiations with the non-VWP member states to 
push through its new PNR requirements in return for a (possible) admission of the ‘willing’ to 
the VWP. In defiance of the Commission’s call for Union discipline, the Czech Republic and 
others immediately declared their interest in such arrangements, finally yet importantly because 
they had been left alone by the Commission in the earlier phases of the VWP struggle.
101 
It would appear important for the EU negotiators to recognise that defending European 
convictions in the PNR and other negotiations openly and right from the start would produce 
better results than a partial abandonment of positions in view of some assumed reactions by the 
‘European public’. In the end, why should the European population suffer more from such 
disruption than the Americans should? The answer to this question remains open and it is 
definitely not worth abandoning a good negotiation argument for it. 
2.3  PNR and resistance to excessive intrusion 
Although the term ‘resistance’ alludes to times of foreign occupation and totalitarian regimes, it 
has become more and more common in recent years to describe an attitude towards a growing 
tendency of “replacing the law [through] counter-terrorism practices across states” (Bigo, 2006). 
Resistance in this sense takes place not in a clandestine fashion, but by individuals and 
organisations that in one way or another take part in legislative decision-making, in 
implementing and applying existing legislation or in shaping public opinion. 
One has certainly to distinguish various types of opposition: in some cases, it is a concern of 
democracy, the rule of law and privacy, while in others resistance may coincide with commercial 
interests as in the case of airlines that find it an annoying burden to participate in the tightened 
surveillance of passengers. But it is worthwhile to list all those who object to the current system. 
                                                      
99 See Council of the European Union (2001). 
100 The same situation exists for Greece, which the US authorities have always considered too unreliable to 
join the VWP (see Siskin, 2005, p. 19). 
101 The Czech Interior Minister Ivan Langer made clear that his country’s patience – waiting for EU efforts 
to bear fruit – had expired: “I’m a free human being in Europe and I’m not a slave of the European 
Commission” (EuroNews of 28 February 2008, retrieved from http://www.euronews.net/index.php? 
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2.3.1 Government  institutions 
Regarding the institutions, one can easily identify the gap between executive and legislative 
powers, at least on this side of the Atlantic.  
In both the US and Canada, the post-9/11 counter-terrorism legislation (US Patriot Act and the 
Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act) as proposed by governments received almost unanimous support 
by the respective legislatures,
102 despite serious objections about incompatibility with 
fundamental rights having been voiced by civil rights groups and other critics. In 2005–06, when 
the respective Acts had to be renewed, a considerable difference became apparent between the 
two countries, with US Congress reconfirming the Act with almost the same overwhelming 
majority as back in 2001, while the Canadian House of Commons clearly refused the renewal of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act. 
Within the EU, even governments – despite many avowals of solidarity – were initially hesitant 
to pick up the pace of change adopted by the US (Hamilton, 2006; Rees, 2006; Spence, 2007), 
but this eventually started to change, especially after the Madrid and London bombings, which 
made terrorism a threat more directly felt by the population (Cameron, 2007). With the 2005 
Hague Programme, the Prüm Treaty of the same year and its inclusion in the EU framework 
(2007) and finally the EU Border Package of February 2008 as major milestones on a road to 
‘seamless security’, one can easily see that European security politics have moved away from 
former ideals. They are rapidly approaching the neighbourhood of US 9/11 concepts.
103 
Legislatures have been more combative in defending civil liberties: the European Parliament 
challenged the 2004 EU–US Agreement in PNR matters in court for breaches of fundamental 
rights,
104 commented positively on the draft EU–Canada Agreement
105 and denounced, through a 
highly critical Resolution of July 2007,
106 the new instrument with the US as “substantively 
flawed”.
107 Additionally, at the member state level, parliaments have remained critical and 
vigilant, above all the UK House of Lords with its extremely detailed PNR report in preparation 
for the 2007 EU–US Agreement.
108 Other parliaments have also left indications that they look 
closely at such proposals and take the trouble to stand up against their governments when they 
see human rights violations.
109 
                                                      
102 See the article “USA PATRIOT Act” in Wikipedia (retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/USA_PATRIOT_Act); see also the article “Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act” in Wikipedia (retrieved 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Anti-Terrorism_Act). 
103 Such a conclusion may be drawn from statements by national politicians who increasingly tend to 
‘think the unthinkable’ with regard to counter-terrorism, in terms of abandoning established democratic 
and legal principles, for example the distinction between internal and external security and the 
presumption of innocence (see Spiegel Online, 2007, reporting on some “excursions on dangerous terrain” 
by German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble). 
104 The European Parliament succeeded insofar as the Agreement was annulled, but for reasons of “ultra 
vires” and not for the reasons of substance emphasised by the European Parliament (see UK Parliament, 
House of Lords, 2007, p. 21).  
105 See ePractice.eu (2005). 
106 See European Parliament (2007). 
107 See EurActiv (2007b). 
108 See UK Parliament, House of Lords (2007). 
109 Just to cite two examples, see that for Germany in Deutscher Bundestag (2007) and the Czech Republic 
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2.3.2 Judiciary 
The  judiciary, which in general counter-terrorism matters has acquired a reputation of 
courageously defending civil liberties against intrusions by the executive,
110 has earned much 
less merit in the specific PNR field. The European Court of Justice profoundly disappointed the 
European Parliament (the plaintiff) in Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, when its annulment 
of the 2004 EU–US Agreement was solely founded on “ultra vires” rather than on a breach of 
fundamental rights.
111 Among the deplorable consequences of the decision, 1) PNR data when 
used for counter-terrorism purposes no longer benefits from privacy protection under Directive 
95/46/EC, but finds itself in a legal void owing to the lack of a third-pillar data protection 
instrument; and 2) the European Parliament will for the time being “have no formal say in the 
negotiation of any subsequent agreement” (UK Parliament, House of Lords, 2007, p. 22). 
2.3.3  Data protection authorities 
The main burden – as always on battlefields of this kind – has been resting on the shoulders of 
data protection supervisors and privacy commissioners.  
In Canada, the federal Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) jointly with colleagues from 
the provinces achieved a first major success in 2003 by removing a “genuine and unprecedented 
privacy threat” emanating from the new “Big Brother” database on travel activities as designed 
by Canadian customs (then the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency).
112 A second victory 
for privacy interests was seen in the additional commitments made by the new CBSA in 2005 in 
the context of the EU–Canada Agreement. Being an executive instrument on the Canadian side 
and the involvement of privacy institutions thus not compulsory, the achievement is credited to 
the EU Article 29 Working Party under Directive 95/46/EC, whose opinion
113 was followed in 
this context.
114 In recent years, efforts to avoid erosions of privacy rights have been less 
successful, notably in the case of the Passenger Protect Programme/no-fly list of 2007
115 when a 
joint resolution by all the privacy commissioners was simply not taken into account. The current 
review of the Privacy Act of 1983 is seen as a test case of the extent to which the privacy 
commissioners will be able to influence future privacy-related policies.
116 
In the EU, the untiring efforts by data protection authorities (DPAs) are documented by at least 
15 detailed opinions delivered since 2002 by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
which deals exclusively with airline passenger data.
117 This accounts for approximately 10% of 
the report volume produced by the Working Party and is at the top of the interventions by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor Peter Hustinx. These opinions and their undeniable impact 
on policy-making are covered in more detail below in the legal analysis of the respective 
instruments. 
                                                      
110 An example here is that of the acquittal of 9/11 suspect Mounir al-Motassadeq by the German High 
Court BGH. For reasons of counter-terrorist strategy, he had been deprived of taking advantage of his full 
rights under the criminal procedure act – see Brimmer (2006); see also Spiegel Online (2004).  
111 See the ECJ judgment of 30 May 2006 (cited in appendix I of this report).  
112 See the OPC (2003).  
113 Refer to Opinion 1/2005 of the Article 29 Working Party (2005). 
114 Derived from the letter dated 5 May 2008 from the OPC (C. Baggaley) to the author. 
115 See section 1.2.3.2 above. 
116 See the Statement by Privacy Commissioner Stoddard of 29 April 2008 (OPC, 2008).  
117 For a complete list of opinions/reports of the Article 29 Working Party see the European Commission’s 
website, DG FSJ, “Documents adopted by the Data Protection Working Party” (retrieved from 
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2.3.4  NGOs and others 
Besides ‘data protectors’, it is mainly civil liberties NGOs
118 and monitoring services that 
contribute to raising public awareness of privacy intrusions. Statewatch, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Centre (EPIC) and Privacy International maintain specific observatories on airline 
data.
119 
Airline resistance is mainly inspired by the legitimate interests of trade, to prevent excessive 
government regulation beyond what is necessary for ensuring traffic safety. They oppose 
external interference on the content and structure of PNR records, pointing quite convincingly to 
the financial sector, which has never seen an effort to “impose restrictions on the world’s 
financial institutions to regulate what data can or should be part of that transaction” (ICAO, 
2004). 
3.  Acceptability check: Is the EU–Canada Agreement any better than the 
controversial EU–US instruments? 
Having performed this panoramic overview of airline passenger data and its functions, uses and 
abuses in current times in the North Atlantic region, it would now be appropriate to look more 
closely at the individual instruments to see how well they conform to the legal frameworks 
created at the national and international levels. 
All current privacy legislation goes back to the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 1980,
120 which – indicating its name and 
provenance – is not in the first place a defensive instrument in favour of citizens to protect them 
against privacy intrusions but rather a tool of trade facilitation. Its purpose is to prevent the 
“danger that disparities in national legislations could hamper the free flow of personal data 
across frontiers”, which in turn “could cause serious disruption in important sectors of the 
economy, such as banking and insurance” (OECD, 1980, p. 1). Still, the principles established 
by the OECD, ranging from “collection limitation” to “accountability”, seem to please everyone, 
at least as they allow for some creative interpretation of the rules.  
Although all parties claim to start from the same golden rules, it is striking to see how the 
terminology diverges among the various national and regional implementations of the OECD 
guidelines: confusion starts within the guidelines themselves, whose section headings are not 
always representative of what the section contains.  
For example, section 7, entitled “Collection limitation principle” also includes fair information 
elements, i.e. that the person concerned should have given his/her consent to the collection or at 
least knows about it. Others wishing to adapt the OECD rules to academic or practical purposes 
have left the principles unchanged but they attach entirely different labels to them (Shimanek, 
2001).
121 The most common implementation mode, however, is to 1) redraft the text of the 
                                                      
118 For a comprehensive listing of privacy organisations and other resources, see the EPIC’s “Online 
Guide to Privacy Resources” (retrieved from http://epic.org/privacy/privacy_resources_faq.html# 
Privacy_Organizations). 
119 Refer to Statewatch’s “Observatory on the exchange of data on passengers (PNR) with USA” (retrieved 
from http://www.statewatch.org/pnrobservatory.htm); see also the EPIC’s “EU–US Airline Passenger 
Data Disclosure” (retrieved from http://epic.org/privacy/intl/passenger_data.html); and also Privacy 
International’s “Travel Surveillance” (retrieved from http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml? 
cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-559086). 
120 See OECD (1980). 
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principles, 2) reassign certain elements from one principle to another, 3) modify the 
names/labels of principles, and 4) completely reshuffle the order of the principles. 
Implementation instruments have again found different structures and organisation principles in 
reproducing the OECD rules
122 – to the extent that the unfamiliar reader often feels left alone, 
desperately wishing that this ‘Babylonian confusion of tongues’ be mitigated at least by a table 
of correspondence linking the various terminologies. 
The present report thus attempts to find a pragmatic way to give appropriate weight to the 
different privacy-related comments and evaluations, no matter whether they are based on OECD, 
EU, Canadian or other terminologies. 
3.1  Identification of appropriate criteria, notably in the field of recognised 
privacy rules  
In view of the numerous approaches available to structure the basic principles of data protection, 
it seems indispensable to first, opt for a single approach to be applied to all instruments in 
question in order to ensure comparability, and second, to ensure that this approach be visibly 
interlinked with the internationally accepted standards.  
Given the prominent role of the Article 29 Working Party
123 concerning all the PNR instruments 
so far discussed or adopted, notably by providing detailed opinions in the various stages of the 
legislative procedure, it would appear most appropriate to follow their outline in examining the 
compatibility of the EU–Canada Agreement with universal privacy standards. This would be 
combined with the provision of a table of correspondence linking the Working Party’s scheme 
with other standard schemes. 
The utilisation of its own set of terminology and structure – quite distinct from that used under 
Directive 95/46/EC – bears the advantage of not having been directly affected by the ECJ 
decision of 30 May 2006, which declared the Directive inapplicable to enforcement-related PNR 
matters.
124 
On the Canadian side, the terminology question is equally complicated: the Privacy Act of 1980, 
still stemming from the pre-OECD period, does not even contain a list of principles, while such a 
list is available in the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 
of 2000, but formally the latter Act only applies to private-sector data issues. In practice, 
Canadian privacy commissioners loosely refer to fair information principles and practices and 
global privacy standards
125 as accepted at the international level.
126 Furthermore, Canadian 
privacy experts have become broadly familiar with the EU nomenclature – especially since the 
                                                      
122 Clarke (2000, ss. 2.4 and 2.5) attributes this to different approaches ranging from conventional “fair 
information practice” policies with an emphasis on the protection of data (rather than the persons 
concerned) to those based on the recognition of a “fundamental human right” (e.g. Art. 1(1) of Directive 
95/46/EC). 
123 See the Working Party under Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 1995). 
124 See the 2006 ECJ judgment cited in appendix I of this report. 
125 See the 28
th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (2006). 
126 Ibid. TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 33 
 
Article 29 Working Group, with its opinions, exercised a decisive influence on the outcome of 
the EU–Canada PNR negotiations.
127 
The standard examination scheme employed by the Article 29 Working Party – as referred to in 
Opinion 3/2004
128 – implies the following elements: 
a)  Data protection should be recognised as a fundamental right to the end that any restriction 
imposed must be carefully weighed to find a balance between security concerns and the 
civil liberty at stake (Article 29 Working Party, 2004). 
b)  Due regard should be given to the transitional character of adequacy findings – in view of 
rapidly changing threat scenarios in the case of terrorism and transnational crime, data 
flows should not be authorised for an undetermined period but made subject to a sunset 
limitation. 
c)  Basic data protection principles should be applied (“content principles”) as set out 
below.
129 
i)  Purpose limitation principle 
Data should be processed for a specific purpose and subsequently used or further 
communicated only insofar as this is not incompatible with the purpose of the 
transfer. 
ii)  Data quality and proportionality principle 
Data should be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. The data should be 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
transferred or further processed. 
iii)  Transparency principle 
Individuals should be provided with information as to the purpose of the processing 
and the identity of the data controller in the third country, and other information 
insofar as this is necessary to ensure fairness. 
iv)  Security principle 
Technical and organisational security measures should be taken by the data 
controller that are appropriate to the risks presented by the processing. Any person 
acting under the authority of the data controller, including a processor, must not 
process data except on instructions from the controller. 
v)  Rights of access, rectification and opposition 
The data subject should have a right to obtain a copy of all data relating to him/her 
that are processed, and a right to rectification of those data where they are shown to 
be inaccurate. In certain situations, s/he should also be able to object to the 
processing of the data relating to him/her. 
                                                      
127 Derived from the letter of 5 May 2008 from the Canadian OPC (C. Baggaley) to the author, underlining 
the importance of the Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 1/2005, all the more as the OPC was not invited 
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128 See Article 29 Working Party (2004), s. 2. 
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vi)  Restrictions on onward transfers 
Further transfers of the personal data by the recipient of the original data transfer 
should be permitted only where the second recipient (i.e. the recipient of the onward 
transfer) is also subject to rules affording an adequate level of protection. 
d)  Procedural/enforcement mechanisms should be in place that provide
130 
i)  a good level of compliance with the rules; 
ii)  support and help to individual data subjects; and 
iii)  appropriate redress to the injured party. 
3.2  Evaluation of the EU–Canada Agreement of July 2005 
The ‘model’ among PNR instruments with its strikingly “good balance between security 
requirements and the data protection standards”
131 is the result of close scrutiny exercised by the 
EU data protection authorities, as can well be evidenced by comparing the Agreement text at its 
various states of development (see Box 4). 
Box 4. Various comments on the EU–Canada Agreement 
The Article 29 Working Party delivered two detailed Opinions (3/2004 and 1/2005) on the level of 
protection granted to PNR data in Canada in addition to an opinion by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the proposed agreement as such (EDPS, 2005a). Meanwhile, other bodies have 
confined themselves to very meagre contributions: the European Parliament rejected the Agreement 
for the formal reason that the new instrument should not be concluded before the outcome of the ECJ 
procedures on the EU–US instrument was known (European Parliament, 2005). MEPs conceded, 
however, that content-wise the Agreement represented an “acceptable balance” (ibid.).  
 
The initial comments on the Canadian adequacy situation in PNR matters were still rather 
critical – hardly different from those issued on previous EU–US negotiations – but the tone 
changed decisively with the progress of negotiations between the Commission and Canadian 
authorities and the improvements conceded by the customs/border authorities. 
3.2.1 Data  protection  as a fundamental right 
The reference to the fundamental rights character is a reminder that privacy is not just any 
‘lightweight’ position within the EU legal order, but on the contrary is an important pillar of the 
legal order that may be subject to restriction only if a similarly important interest is at stake 
(Article 29 Working Party, 1998). 
In the case of the PNR, the value at stake is the ‘fight against terrorism’, which is routinely 
accepted as a sufficiently developed counterweight since it represents “both a necessary and 
valuable element of democratic societies” (Article 29 Working Party, 2004). Yet in this context, 
terrorism does not stand on its own, it is combined – just as in the case of the 2004 EU–US 
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Agreement – with the much wider field of “terrorism-related and other serious crimes, including 
organised crime, that are transnational in nature”.
132  
This position is in sharp contrast to the Commission’s Decision 2006/253/EC on the adequate 
protection of personal data transferred to the CBSA (henceforth ‘Adequacy Decision’), which 
solely refers to the Community’s “commitment to supporting Canada in the fight against 
terrorism”.
133 Surprisingly, not even the normal watchdogs (the Article 29 Working Party or the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)) take any offence at this – neither at the 
divergence between the adequacy finding and the actual Agreement text, nor at the diffuse 
concept of “terrorism-related and other serious crimes”, which leaves room for a wide spectrum 
of interpretations.
134 
In its first Opinion (3/2004), the Article 29 Working Party still expressed serious doubts as to 
these “too widely defined purposes” (Article 29 Working Party, 2004, s. 6), but dropped this 
charge in early 2005, without any significant amendments having been made to the text.
135 Only 
the UK House of Lords (2007, paras. 104f.) remained sceptical of the delicate aspects of this 
formula, which by now seems to have acquired the status of an EU standard clause, as contained 
in the US Agreements of 2004 and 2007 as well as in the proposal for an EU PNR system of 
2007.
136 This situation leads to the simple question, “[H]ow serious must a crime be to fall 
within this description and so be covered by the PNR Agreement?” (UK Parliament, House of 
Lords, 2007). 
As there is presently no internationally agreed definition of ‘serious crimes’ (nor ‘terrorism-
related crimes’!), the formula chosen raises considerable doubts not only under the fundamental 
rights aspect but also under that of purpose limitation and onward transfer. Crimes other than 
terrorism are likely to bring in entirely different sets of authorities concerned, which will in turn 
widen the scope of those accessing the data in question (see section 3.2.3.6 below). At this stage, 
the question should be kept in mind as to whether a positive list of ‘serious crime’ categories 
(loosely inspired by the model of the European Arrest Warrant)
137 should be agreed – best at a 
multilateral level – to avoid grave inconsistencies in international privacy protection. 
3.2.2 Transitional  character of the adequacy finding 
Data protection supervisors warn that adequacy findings are not made for eternity: they represent 
a snapshot of the current state of foreign privacy legislation, which is clearly subject to change 
(EDPS, 2005a, para. 10). Besides the option of an ad hoc suspension of data flows in the case of 
major changes, any such arrangements should be time-limited (Article 29 Working Party, 2005, 
s. 3). This is best done by means of a sunset limitation bringing the adequacy finding and thus 
the agreement to an automatic end if not renewed within a given time period (Article 29 
Working Party, 2004, s. 3).  
 
 
                                                      
132 Refer to the EU–Canada PNR Agreement (2005), 1
st recital. 
133 See European Commission (2005b), 8
th recital. 
134 Refer to the Article 29 Working Party (2004 and 2005), as well as EDPS (2005a). 
135 See Article 29 Working Party (2005), s. 3. 
136 See European Commission (2007a). 
137 Refer to the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
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The 2005 Agreement fully complies with this requirement by foreseeing 1) in its Art. 5(2) that 
the obligation of air carriers to transmit PNR data to Canadian authorities ceases to exist with the 
expiry of the Adequacy Decision, and 2) in Art. 7 of the Adequacy Decision that the Decision 
expires after 3.5 years if not extended beforehand. 
A continuous monitoring of the Agreement and its operation is ensured by the Joint Committee 
under Art. 6 of the Agreement, which is in charge of settling possible disputes (Art. 7) and 
organising the joint reviews (Art. 8). 
3.2.3  Compliance with content principles 
Compliance with the standard data protection principles, as specified under section 3.1 above, is 
seen as discussed below. 
3.2.3.1 Purpose  limitation 
Both the European Commission and EU data protection authorities have positively expressed 
their satisfaction that the PNR data transferred from EU air carriers to the CBSA will be 
“processed for a specific purpose and subsequently used or further communicated only insofar as 
this is not incompatible with the purpose of the transfer. In particular, PNR data will be used 
strictly for purposes of preventing and combating: terrorism and related crimes [along with] 
other serious crimes, including organised crime, that are transnational in nature.”
138 
Doubts remain, however, about the extent to which such a wide formula may be considered an 
effective ‘purpose limitation’: one might just refer to the initial comments by the Article 29 
Working Party, with the criticism that  
these purposes are too widely defined, and in particular go well beyond the purpose of 
fighting acts of terrorism. Automatic access by customs and law enforcement authorities 
to personal and commercial data contained in airline passengers’ information constitutes 
an unprecedented derogation to the right to collect data for commercial purposes and 
should only be justified on the basis of very serious concerns.
139  
Between the first and the second intervention by the Article 29 Working Party, the original text 
was amended only insofar as the transnational element was added as a further condition for the 
use of PNR data. This, however, changes nothing about the ambiguity of the term ‘serious 
crimes’ for which the Canadian authorities wish to use PNR data; it is therefore hard to 
understand where the sudden satisfaction of the Article 29 Working Party stems from. Neither 
have the Canadian authorities delivered the “clear and limited list of serious offences directly 
related to terrorism” required by the Working Party nor have they provided any confirmation 
that the serious crimes at stake have a “clear relationship with terrorism”.
140 
3.2.3.2 Data  quality and proportionality 
As with most categories, comments are broadly positive regarding the data quality and 
proportionality criterion. When the Commission’s Adequacy Decision claims full success in all 
major items negotiated with the Canadian authorities, it meets no opposition by data protection 
authorities (not even by civil liberties groups!). 
                                                      
138 See European Commission (2007a), 15
th recital; see also the Article 29 Working Party (2005), s. 3; and 
also EDPS (2005a), s. 4.3. 
139 See Article 29 Working Party (2004), s. 6. 
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Limited list of categories
141 
The particularly lengthy list of 38 data categories
142 initially required by the CBSA was reduced 
to 25, more specifically by eliminating so-called ‘open categories’ that could reveal sensitive 
information on the passengers. Remaining doubts by the EDPS concerned categories 10 
(frequent flyer information) and 23 (APIS information), as such data could still concern sensitive 
aspects of behaviour – but were considered “not serious enough to require renegotiating the 
Agreement” (EDPS, 2005a, s. 4.2). 
Transmission solely through the push method 
A major achievement was the exclusive adoption of the push method, thus allowing airlines to 
keep control over the data transfer.
143  
Enhanced data quality 
Finally yet importantly, as a result of their own painful experience (see the Maher case),
144 the 
Canadian authorities subscribed to two crucial commitments, i.e. 1) to apply no change to the 
PNR data obtained, and 2) to collect additional data to supplement PNR data only through lawful 
channels (European Commission, 2005b, 16
th recital). Such precautions help to avoid major 
errors in the targeting of suspects (so-called ‘false positive hits’), which are mainly attributed to 
the poor data quality of enforcement databases and watch lists. 
Reduced retention periods 
While approving in principle the Canadian system of graded access during successive retention 
periods (in 0-72 hours, direct access to the full name record by customs/immigration officers; 
from 72 hours to the end of 2 years, name anonymised towards most officials except intelligence 
officers; from 3 years to the end of 6 years, the personalisation data is accessible only in very 
exceptional cases), the Article 29 Working Party objected to the “rather long” period during 
which personalised data items remained accessible. Data should remain personalised only during 
the initial period following entry into the territory (Article 29 Working Party, 2004, s. 5.5). 
After considerable concessions by the CBSA, the maximum retention period was reduced from 6 
to 3.5 years, with the name data being accessible after the initial 72-hour period only in very 
exceptional circumstances.
145  
3.2.3.3 Transparency 
As a primary element of transparency, the Article 29 Working Party requested the Commission 
to include a “full picture of the relevant Canadian regulatory framework…as an annex to the 
Commission Decision” (Article 29 Working Party, 2004, s. 5). Although this formal requirement 
was not complied with, a concise description of the Canadian regulatory framework is contained 
in the Working Party’s Opinion 3/2004 (see Box 5). 
                                                      
141 Refer to Annex II of the Agreement (EU–Canada, 2005). 
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to the Article 29 Working Party (2004), s. 6.3. 
143 See the Commitments by the CBSA in the Annex to Decision 2006/253/EC (European Commission, 
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Box 5. The Canadian regulatory framework 
In basic terms, the API/PNR programme was set up in 2001 by the predecessors of the CBSA under 
the Customs Act (Bill S-23) and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Section 107.1 
of the Customs Act together with section 148(1)(d) of the IRPA allowed the government, by means of 
the Passenger Information (Customs) Regulations, to require the provision of API/PNR data prior to 
arrival in Canada. The IRPA as amended by Bill C-17 allows for information-sharing arrangements 
with other Canadian agencies. 
Sources: Article 29 Working Party (2004), s. 5; for the Canadian legislation cited, see appendix I of this report. 
 
Under the auspices of transparency, the CBSA also committed itself to provide information to 
travellers concerning the purpose of the transfer and processing, and the identity of the data 
controller.
146 Furthermore, the Commission’s Adequacy Decision provides clear instructions as 
to the circumstances under which the data flow to Canada is to be suspended by member states 
(European Commission, 2005b, Arts 3 and 4).  
3.2.3.4 Security   
EU data protection authorities excel in praising the technical and organisational security 
measures taken by Canadian authorities
147 in order to avoid data leakages. There has been no 
complaint in this regard (EDPS, 2005a, s. 2). 
3.2.3.5  Rights of access, rectification and opposition 
While the Canadian system of providing redress procedures to data subjects has been 
considered exemplary right from the start, initial criticism sharply denounced the exclusion of 
foreigners not resident/present in Canada from this mechanism (EDPS, 2005a, s. 2). The CBSA 
has therefore agreed, in section 31 of the commitments, to allow EU residents to initiate a 
complaint through their national data protection authorities, which was considered a satisfactory 
solution (Article 29 Working Party, 2005, s. 3.6.1). 
It is underlined by the EU data protection authorities that the agreed redress procedures – just as 
all the other commitments made by the Canadian authorities – are based on legally binding 
engagements, which distinguishes them positively from similar arrangements taken with the US 
(EDPS, 2005a, s. 4.1, 18). In addition, Canadian legislation provides for criminal and other 
sanctions in the event that the commitments are not respected. Finally, the privacy commissioner 
is empowered under the Privacy Act to commence an investigation in respect of the disclosure of 
personal information.
148  
3.2.3.6  Restrictions on onward transfers 
The issue of onward transfers as regulated by the CBSA again meets with full approval by the 
EU DPAs,
149 since according to the commitments 1) transfers/disclosures will never be made in 
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147 Ibid., s. 33ff. 
148 Ibid., s. 35. 
149 See Article 29 Working Party (2004), s. 6.5; see also Article 29 Working Party (2005), s. 3.5; and also 
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bulk but decided on a case-by-case basis, 2) there will be no online access granted to other 
authorities and 3) disclosures will depend on the conditions that a) they are relevant to the other 
agency, b) they respect the purpose limitation referred to under 3.2.3.1 above, and c) the 
recipients undertake to afford it the same protection.
150 Similar safeguards apply to the disclosure 
to other countries.
151 
The only doubt that remains over this perfect construction concerns the imprecise purpose 
limitation that we have already denounced under section 3.2.3.1 above. Vague terms such as 
‘serious crimes’, with their strong risk of diverging interpretations, are quite likely to hamper the 
effective protection of privacy interests, especially when data flows occur at the international 
level. 
3.2.4 Procedural/enforcement  mechanisms 
Although most of the procedural items have already been touched upon in connection with the 
content principles, a few references should be made. 
3.2.4.1  Good level of compliance with the rules 
The existence of mechanisms ensuring a high level of compliance has been extensively 
appreciated by the EU DPAs, for a number of reasons: 1) the advanced technical and 
organisational security measures referred to in section 3.2.3.4 above, 2) a refined system of 
redress available to citizens concerned, 3) legally binding commitments subscribed to by the 
Canadian authorities combined with criminal and other sanctions in case of infringements, and 
4) the independent role of the privacy commissioner serving as a watchdog over compliance 
with the law (refer to section 3.2.3.5 above). 
3.2.4.2  Support and help provided to individual data subjects 
Citizens benefit from the general transparency principle, which requires the authorities to 
advertise 1) the fact that passenger data is being collected as well as 2) the reasons for doing so 
and 3) finally the possibilities of redress granted under the Privacy Act. An important support 
function has been entrusted to the privacy commissioners at the national and provincial levels, 
who may independently examine cases of possible infringements to the privacy rules (refer to 
sections 3.2.3.3 and 3.2.3.5 above). 
3.2.4.3  Appropriate redress provided to the injured party 
The Canadian redress procedures – generally considered fully appropriate – are described in 
more detail in section 3.2.3.5 above. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the EU–Canada Agreement to a large extent lives up to the high 
expectations nourished by the numerous positive reviews it has received in recent years, mainly 
in comparison with agreements signed on the same subject with the US. Aside from the minor 
digression from the ‘path of virtue’ in terms of the somewhat imprecise description of the 
purposes pursued by the Agreement, the text truly confirms its reputation of a well-crafted 
instrument that takes up its responsibility to protect citizens to the utmost degree from undue 
privacy intrusions that may occur during the operation of PNR mechanisms. 
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3.3 Comparative  overview  of  other major PNR instruments
152 
A comparison between the EU–Canada Agreement and other recent instruments gives additional 
clarity as to the quality of this flagship instrument; it also contributes to identifying the current 
tendencies in revised PNR concepts – possibly a signpost to where the forthcoming EU–Canada 
negotiations will lead. 
3.3.1  The EU–US Agreement of 2004 
Turning away from Canada and looking at the EU agreements with the US, one quickly becomes 
aware that this is another category of international cooperation: the contrast could hardly be 
more striking even at first sight. 
The EU–US instruments already stand out by the sheer number of critical comments they have 
attracted. This may have to do with the scrutiny to which US action at the international level is 
traditionally exposed. Nevertheless, such scolding does not exclusively come from those who 
frequently pinpoint US human rights violations in the context of Iraq, FBI/CIA intrigues or the 
Guantanamo/Abu Ghraib prisons. There also are highly reputed bodies such as the UK House of 
Lords EU Select Committee, which gives a strong warning against undesirable trends 
developing in PNR negotiations with the US.
153 They are part of a much larger group of public 
institutions, data protection authorities and media whose statements, warnings and protests 
including judicial action have accompanied the entire history of EU–US negotiations and 
arrangements.  
If it is true that in the case of Canada, the public hardly took note of the event and even public 
bodies spent a minimum of paper in order to deliver their – mainly well-received – comments, 
the opposite applies to the US negotiations. Especially the data protection authorities have 
lavished the negotiation parties with good advice and admonition – and have been regularly 
disillusioned to see that their detailed opinions had all had been in vain. The European 
Parliament, after its objections against the Commission’s adequacy finding had not been 
accepted, saw no other way out than to challenge the relevant Commission and Council 
decisions. Civil liberties organisations such as Statewatch, the EPIC and Privacy International, 
which remain practically silent on the EU–Canada Agreement, dedicate entire ‘observatories’ to 
EU–US airline passenger data disclosure. 
This peculiar situation might best be explained by the heated atmosphere in the aftermath of 
9/11: the transatlantic divide in the search for appropriate solutions in tackling terrorist threats 
had its repercussions down to the details of airline passenger control. The ‘war’ (as opposed to 
the ‘fight’) against terror, as seen by the US side, justified the use of uncommon means: at the 
latest by July 2003, the US had removed the separation (‘wall’) between information obtained by 
the law enforcement and intelligence communities (Rees, 2006, p. 82). This also allowed a wider 
choice of options when looking at details of airline security risks. Europeans felt irritated not 
                                                      
152 Owing to time and space constraints, this report confines itself to an examination of the transatlantic 
instruments. Other texts on the international/regional levels would be interesting to look at, but in most 
cases they have not yet reached the status of adoption or at least advanced preparation (e.g. the proposal 
for an EU Framework Decision of 2007 and planned EU–Australia and EU–Korea agreements). The only 
text fully operational is the 2005 MoU between Canada and Switzerland, which follows similar 
orientations as that for the EU and Canada. 
153 Refer to the statement by Lord Wright of Richmond, Committee Chairman, of 13 June 2007, according 
to which the new PNR Agreement should be clear, unambiguous and not allow the US to amend the 
undertakings unilaterally (see the CEPS CHALLENGE article, “Lords EU Committee Raise Concerns 
over Passenger Name Record Agreement with US”, 13 June 2007 (retrieved from 
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only by the greater ease in restraining civil liberties and “breaking with democratic traditions” 
(Cameron, 2007) but also by the rapid change of strategies in such a sensitive area.  
European suspicion was particularly fed by subsequent discoveries that – while official 
negotiations were still in progress – US authorities had already been working on system changes 
incompatible with the results so far obtained (e.g. exploitation of PNR data by targeting devices 
such as CAPPS II, ATS and Secure Flight).
154† Negotiators were puzzled that the US delegation 
repeatedly came back with imprecise treaty language, blanket clauses and so forth, which are 
inadmissible in terms of data protection (purpose limitation principle). Even the official European 
Commission report on the joint review of the 2004 Agreement complained that access to certain 
control records had been restricted by the DHS for reasons of secrecy (European Commission, 
2005, p. 6). 
In view of the volume of controversial aspects, the following review confines itself to those that 
are essential for enabling a comparison with the EU–Canada Agreement. 
The compliance problem of the 2004 US Agreement and the degree of its divergence from the 
EU–Canada instrument may also be illustrated in a quantitative manner: with regard to the 21 
criteria applied by the Article 29 Working Party to check privacy compliance, commitments by 
the US side
155 failed to comply with the rules in roughly two-thirds of the items (14.5 = 66%).
156 
By way of comparison, the Canadian commitments had been deemed appropriate in practically 
all areas with a low failure rate of just 1.5 (= 7%) items of non-compliance.
157 
Major items of concern are set out below (following the order of section 3.2 above). 
Item 1. Data protection as a fundamental right 
Privacy protection as a fundamental right may be restricted only if an interest of a similar value 
is at stake. Such a balance of values may be assumed for counter-terrorism but not for the second 
purpose cited, i.e. “preventing and combating of…other serious crimes”, which is considered 
“too vague” to be acceptable as a description of purposes (Article 29 Working Party, 2004a, s. 
5B). 
Item 2. Transitional character of the adequacy findings 
Formally, there is compliance with this item: 1) there is a ‘sunset clause’ to terminate the 
Adequacy Decision/Agreement if it is not renewed within a delay of 3.5 years. 2) Joint reviews 
to detect possible malfunctions are foreseen on a regular basis according to section 5 of the 2004 
EU–US Agreement. 3) In the case of malfunctions, member states may suspend the data flow 
according to Art. 3 of the Adequacy Decision (European Commission, 2004). 
On the practical level, however, the first joint review held in 2005 revealed a number of 
obstacles to satisfactory verification of data routines, notably related to 1) certain records being 
denied to the review team for reasons of secrecy and 2) the technical impossibility for the US 
CBP to identify complaints/requests relating to EU PNR data (European Commission, 2005; 
Guild & Brouwer, 2006). 
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Item 3. Compliance with content principles 
Item 3.1 Purpose limitation 
The lack of unambiguous purpose descriptions is criticised at various instances: besides the 
imprecise term of ‘serious crimes’ – which as a minimum would have required an explanatory 
list of crimes concerned – there is the intended use of PNR data for unspecified “law 
enforcement purposes” (Article 29 Working Party, 2004a, s. 5E). 
Furthermore, the Working Party points to the following blanket clause-types of inadequacies in 
the description of purposes: 
•  the lack (still) of an available list of the agencies authorised to receive data by means of 
onward transfer; 
•  a blanket clause allowing the CBP, in its discretion, to forward data to any authorities, 
including foreign ones, with “law enforcement functions”;
158 and 
•  a blanket clause permitting data transfer “as otherwise required by the law” (ibid., s. 35). 
Specifically harsh criticism was given to the undeclared use of PNR data for mass data 
processing under targeting/profiling systems such as CAPPS II or similar programmes – such 
systems, being qualitatively different from the mere transfer of passenger data, required 
additional consideration and specific safeguards (Article 29 Working Party, 2004a, s. 3). 
The EU authorities again became concerned about the delicate aspects of such mass data 
processing, when they were confronted by the existence of yet other profiling and targeting 
systems such as ATS and Secure Flight whose existence had not even been revealed to the joint 
review team.
159  
Item 3.2 Data quality and proportionality 
List of data categories  
The final list of 34 data categories found no approval by Article 29 Working Party: it was 
considered excessive since so far, only four acceptable categories had been eliminated from the 
original proposal, while sensitive items such as OSI and SSRs containing information on special 
needs/preferences of passengers remained on the list (Article 29 Working Party, 2004a, s. 5C). 
Transmission through the push method  
The outdated pull method allowing the CBP to access airline computers and pull out the data 
needed remained in place wherever airlines were not yet ready for the new system. The technical 
possibility of roaming around on such computers and obtaining an excessive amount of data was 
solely balanced by a commitment that the CBP would avoid pulling/using sensitive data and 
would delete such data where accidentally pulled.
160  
Contrary to initial intentions, the US side had done very little to replace the former pull method 
with the privacy-compliant push system: the EU review team even assumed that the CBP had the 
intention “to retain some sort of a pull system” (European Commission, 2005, p. 1). 
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Data quality  
Deficiencies regarding data quality were seen in the fact that 1) the access to sensitive data was 
insufficiently blocked (e.g. by use of the pull method) and 2) that the “use of trigger words” to 
eliminate such data represented an inept solution (Article 29 Working Party, 2004a, s. 5D). 
A further data quality problem resulted from matching operations conducted between PNR data 
and – frequently error-prone – search lists such as CAPPS II (ibid., s. 5L). 
Retention periods 
The reduced retention period of 3.5 years (instead of 7 years as initially proposed) was 
welcomed but not accepted as a definite solution. Even the new period is “considerably longer 
than the weeks or months” that may be considered acceptable, and the additional period of 8 
years for manually accessed records was just “disproportionate” (ibid., s. 5F). 
The Working Party (at this stage) was not even aware of the effect, in terms of retention periods, 
of the processing of PNR data by the ATS: in this case, retention was prolonged to 40 years! 
Item 3.3 Transparency 
The Working Party considered the CBP’s plans for informing the travelling public, through a 
standard notice, of the collection of PNR data and related issues as a sufficiently clear method of 
complying with the transparency principle (ibid., s. 5J.1). 
The further issue of a complete description of relevant US legislation to be displayed in the 
annex of the Agreement/Adequacy Decision was not raised here (with the Working Party taking 
a different stance in this instance from their discussion of the EU–Canada Agreement).  
Item 3.4 Security  
No specific remarks were made under this heading; however, the multiple interlinking of PNR 
processing with other procedures (e.g. profiling and targeting) suggests that there may be weak 
links and loopholes that put at risk the security of the entire system.  
From an organisational point of view, the fact that the CBP officers were without guidance as to 
the notion of “serious crimes that are transnational in nature” (European Commission, 2005, p. 
2) casts a negative light on the secure and reliable functioning of the programme. Similarly, the 
system contained no device to identify instances of manual review by CBP officials, which had 
been authorised solely for exceptional cases (ibid.). 
Item 3.5 Rights of access, rectification and opposition 
In contrast to the information aspect, access, rectification and redress procedures are regulated in 
a less satisfactory manner. The system suffers from various exemptions under the Freedom of 
Information Act (1966), which may work against the data subject when the latter seeks access to 
his/her own record – in particular when the disclosure would “interfere with the enforcement 
procedures” or “disclose techniques or procedures” employed by the system.
161 
Rectification under the 1974 Privacy Act is still reserved to US nationals and residents, whereas 
it is uncertain whether the administrative rectification procedure proposed by the CBP (ibid., s. 
39) will work in practice (Article 29 Working Party, 2004a, s. 5J.3) 
                                                      
161 See the Undertakings of the DHS–CBP in the Annex to Decision 2004/535/EC (European Commission, 
2004), s. 38. 44 | PETER HOBBING 
 
Redress procedures as proposed by the CBP were welcomed by the Working Party, which at the 
time expressed doubts about whether the ‘in-house’ procedure involving the DHS chief privacy 
officer as the last point of intercession, even regarding complaints against his/her own office, 
really represented an appropriate solution (ibid., 5J.4). 
Item 3.6 Restrictions on onward transfers 
According to the Working Party, serious shortcomings in the area of onward transfers concerned 
mainly 1) the absence of a list of public bodies entitled to receive the data, and 2) the 
aforementioned blanket clauses in sections 29, 34 and 35 of the CBP Undertakings, which 
give wide discretion in overriding the principles governing privacy protection in general and in 
the present Agreement in particular.  
Accordingly, the CBP may, in its discretion, forward PNR data to government authorities 
(including foreign ones) “with counter-terrorism or law enforcement functions” (s. 29, 
emphasis added). Nothing in this Agreement impedes the use/disclosure of PNR data 1) for the 
protection of vital interests of persons, in particular “significant health risks” (s. 34) and 2) “in 
any judicial proceedings or as otherwise required by law” (s. 35, emphasis added). 
It is certainly no surprise that the Article 29 Working Party, with support from many sides, drew 
the conclusion that, despite some progress made, the situation in privacy protection encountered 
“does not allow a favourable adequacy finding to be achieved” (Article 29 Working Party, 
2004a, Conclusion). 
3.3.2  The interim EU–US Agreement of 2006 
After annulment of the 2004 Agreement by the ECJ decision of 30 May 2006, the parties had to 
act rapidly in order to establish a new instrument compliant with the views of the Court.
162  
Although the challenge from the European Parliament was based on the claim that the 
Commission’s Adequacy Decision and the Council’s decision authorising the signature of the 
Agreement were ultra vires, i.e. in breach of the fundamental principles of Directive 95/46/EC, 
in breach of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality, the Court based its 
decision on the view that the said directive was the wrong legal basis. More specifically, data 
processing operations for the purposes of public security and in the context of criminal law were 
excluded from the scope of this first-pillar instrument. It annulled both instruments, without 
having considered the Parliament’s other arguments.  
The disappointing effect of this judgment is that PNR data, when used for security purposes, do 
not take advantage of enhanced privacy protection as offered by Directive 95/46/EC but find 
themselves somewhere in a legal ‘no man’s land’. In the absence of the third-pillar data 
protection instrument that has yet to be accomplished, the only protection may be derived from 
the human rights norm of Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) (Guild & Brouwer, 2006). 
The first phase between termination of the 2004 Agreement (taking effect on 30 September 
2006) and the entry into force of the 2007 Agreement (end of July 2007) was governed by an 
interim EU–US instrument signed on 16 October 2006. While in the interest of continued 
transatlantic air traffic the EU agreed to the processing of PNR data “in reliance upon DHS’s 
continued implementation of the Undertakings”, they had to accept that “things had changed in  
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Washington during the last couple of years” and that there were new conditions added by the 
DHS as transmitted by the letter from the DHS Assistant Secretary Stewart Baker of October 
2006.
163 
The changes concerned notably the following elements: 
•  The Undertakings of the 2004 Agreement were no longer valid in their original form but 
had to be read “as interpreted in the light of subsequent events” (UK Parliament, House of 
Lords, 2007, s. 60, emphasis as per the original). 
•  On the sharing of data with counter-terrorism-oriented agencies in the framework of an 
information sharing environment (ISE) as required by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, contrary to sections 28–32 of the 2004 Undertakings, 
PNR data now had to be routinely shared with ISE agencies. 
•  The  PNR elements for transmission under field 11 were extended (frequent flyer 
information) to cover all frequent flyer elements such as phone numbers and e-mail 
addresses, as these “may provide crucial links to terrorism”. 
•  Access to PNR data was extended “in the context of infectious disease and other risks to 
passengers” (emphasis added), on the basis of Undertaking 34, whose extensive 
interpretation appeared justified in October 2006 owing to the risk of avian flu. 
•  The 3.5 year’s retention period was cancelled. According to the DHS, with the premature 
termination of the Agreement, the (in their eyes “unacceptably short”) retention period 
was obsolete, even for data transmitted during the validity of the 2004 Agreement. 
Attentive observers such as the House of Lords EU Committee were “reluctant to believe 
this of partners who, we are told, have always negotiated in good faith” (UK Parliament, 
House of Lords, 2007, s. 69).  
As an overall reaction, the new US approach, including its one-sided “consultation/amendment” 
strategy, met with complete lack of understanding by the UK House of Lords: undertakings that 
allow the party giving them to amend them unilaterally “scarcely deserve the name. No such 
provision should be included in any future agreement” (ibid., s. 77). 
This new approach initiated by the Baker letter seems to set the tone not only for the duration of 
the interim 2006 Agreement but also the time after. If the 2004 Agreement appeared backward in 
comparison with the EU–Canada instrument, it is now likely to emerge as a relatively safe and 
solid text, with a much higher privacy profile than all that comes after. We have to examine the 
extent to which this assumption applies to the 2007 instrument. 
3.3.3  The EU–US Agreement of 2007 
At first sight, it is apparent that the 2007 EU–US Agreement has been stripped of the procedural 
safeguards in terms of adequacy decisions, the legislative role of the European Parliament and 
the formal opinions by the Article 29 Working Party and EDPS that had faithfully accompanied 
the adoption of former PNR instruments. It is certainly worthwhile to retrace the “genesis” of the 
2007 Agreement (Guild, 2007) – finally yet importantly to understand why the “successful” 
court action is rightfully referred to as a “Pyrrhic victory” (Privacy International, 2006), not only 
for the European Parliament but also for the interests of privacy protection on the whole.
164  
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From the very beginning, negotiations were under considerable time pressure since the interim 
Agreement was definitely to expire on 31 July 2007. The DHS added to this sense of urgency by 
emphasising that it had no intentions of returning to the former 2004 Agreement and that the 
former Undertakings would “not [even] constitute a precedent” for discussions on the future 
agreement (see Undertaking 48 under the 2004 Agreement).  
The next surprise arrived in terms of a letter from the DHS to the Portuguese presidency (US 
DHS letter, 2007), intending “to explain how…DHS handles” PNR matters in general and 
wishes to handle them with regard to the EU in future (Guild, 2007). It was made very clear that 
the DHS did not wish to enter into discussions on these practices, but that the EU was just 
expected to take note of them (“[w]e trust that this explanation has been helpful to you in 
understanding how we handle EU PNR data”). The EU side replied promptly by confirming that 
“the assurances explained in your letter…allow the European Union to deem…that DHS ensures 
an adequate level of data protection” (EU letter, 2007). On basis of the DHS “assurances”, the 
new Agreement was signed on 23–26 July 2007, provisionally entering into force at the end of 
July. 
The 2007 Agreement, with its threefold components (the Agreement, the DHS letter providing 
assurances about PNR privacy protection as practiced by the DHS and the EU’s reply 
confirming that the level of protection was deemed adequate) is marked by two major 
tendencies. These are 1) the trend towards unilateral influence being exercised on the 
arrangements by the US side and 2) a considerable weakening of data protection safeguards 
(Article 29 Working Party, 2007, p. 2). 
In view of the focus of this report on EU–Canada relations, the evaluation of the instrument is 
concise and confines itself mainly to highlighting the features that underline the current 
tendencies of a stricter, less privacy-minded treatment of passenger data.  
As a general impression, it appears that the new instrument – as primarily shaped by the DHS 
assurances – tends to eliminate those interactive and negotiation-related elements that in the past 
led to lengthy bargaining between the parties. Above all, this applies to the joint review 
mechanism, which the US delegation had perceived as “extremely cumbersome”.
165 From now 
on, the reviews will not take place annually but “periodically” and with the participation of only 
those officials or services deemed “mutually acceptable” (US DHS letter, 2007, Article X), thus 
excluding inter alia DPA expertise and oversight as one of the “main pillars of effective 
protection”.
166 
Regarding the general level of data protection, the DHS assurances contain a somewhat 
enigmatic provision regarding reciprocity and the mutual level of privacy protection (s. IX). 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, the clause might be read in the sense that the future 
EU PNR system should not provide for a level of protection higher than that of the 2007 
Agreement, which would be conceived as a “very worrying development” (Article 29 Working 
Party, 2007, s. 12). 
In terms of individual privacy elements, the discussion follows the structure and terminology 
developed under section 3.2 above whereby only criteria of specific importance to the instrument 
in question are examined. Items 3.3 (Transparency) and 3.4 (Security) are thus omitted, as the 
2007 Agreement does foresee any significant changes in their regard. 
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Item 3. Compliance with content principles 
Item 3.1 Purpose limitation 
From a procedural point of view, it is equally remarkable that, instead of negotiating 
amendments, the DHS will in the future just ‘advise’ the EU of any changes affecting the 
agreed purposes or other passages of the statement (US DHS Letter, 2007, s. I). 
In “exceptional cases” or “emergency circumstances” (largely not further specified), the DHS 
reserves the right to unilaterally suspend certain provisions/safeguards concerning 
•  the transfer of PNR data to foreign governments without ensuring comparable data 
protection (ibid., s. II); 
•  access by the DHS to PNR data not found on the agreed list, including sensitive data 
(ibid., s. III); and 
•  denial or postponement of data access to data subjects as normally granted by the US 
Freedom of Information Act (ibid., s. IV). 
And after all, it does not even seem clear whether the DHS assurances will be published in the 
US  Federal Register, a condition for their becoming legally binding according to US law 
(Article 29 Working Party, 2007, s. 2). 
Content-wise, it is criticised that – beyond the imprecise purpose descriptions found in the 
former agreement – the PNR may now expressly be used for purposes far beyond serious 
criminality, e.g. “for judicial purposes” in general, even in the case of petty crime or “as 
otherwise required by the law” (US DHS letter, 2007, s. I). 
Item 3.2 Data quality and proportionality 
List of data categories 
Appearances may be deceiving: when the European Commission and the DHS proudly 
announced that the number of data elements listed had been reduced from 34 to 19, this seemed 
like good news. In reality, the new numbering was based on data groups (instead of individual 
elements). Moreover, since practically
167 all the elements from 2004 had been retained, partially 
by regrouping them with others,
168 and a few elements had even been added, the list had 
increased from 34 to at least 37 elements covered (Article 29 Working Party, 2007, s. 5). 
Push method 
Although the introduction of the push method had already been obligatory under the 2004 
Agreement, the DHS continued to employ the pull method with direct access to airline 
computers at least in a number of cases. The 2007 DHS assurances mentioned 1 January 2008 as 
the ultimate date for completing the move, but doubts remain about this as a realistic 
assumption. Stumbling blocks could be that the DHS wants to have the final say on 1) the 
technical set-up of the push system, and 2) “when, how and what data to push” (US DHS letter, 
2007, s. VIII). Furthermore, as the DHS wishes to obtain, in exceptional cases, additional data 
from the airline computers (ibid., s. III), observers wonder how this might technically work 
without employing the traditional pull method (Article 29 Working Party, 2007, ss. 5, 7). 
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Retention period 
The DHS assurances also introduced new retention periods, increasing the period from 3.5 to 7 
years, and another period of 8 years was added during which the data is “dormant” (US DHS 
letter, 2007, s. VII). DPAs complain about this “highly worrying” result of 15 year’s retention, 
which is not compatible with recognised privacy standards (Article 29 Working Party, 2007, s. 
9). 
Item 3.5 Rights of access, rectification and opposition 
The rights of data subjects remain vague, not least owing to the uncertainty about the legal 
character of the “assurances” and whether the latter confer formal rights or not (European 
Parliament, 2007, s. 6). As a positive step, the DHS extended administrative Privacy Act 
protection to non-US citizens and residents (US DHS letter, 2007, s. IV). 
Item 3.6 Restrictions on onward transfers 
Such transfers are facilitated by two changes: 1) the widened scope of acceptable purposes (see 
“Purpose limitation” above), which means that a considerable number of additional agencies 
may have a ‘legitimate’ interest in accessing PNR data, and 2) the abolition of the case-by-case 
requirement for such transfers. This might mean that PNR data could now be transferred in bulk 
format. 
Fears voiced by critics regarding unilateral action by the US seemed to prove true in the 
immediate follow-up to the conclusion of the 2007 instrument: by letter of 30 July 2007, the 
DHS requested the EU to agree that all documents related to the negotiation of the Agreement 
“be held in confidence for at least ten years after entry into force of the agreement”. In its reply 
to the DHS, the Council readily confirmed that the “EU shares your understanding regarding the 
confidentiality of the negotiation process” (Statewatch, 2007b, emphasis added). 
And on 15 August 2007, the DHS announced a change to US privacy provisions having an 
important impact on the protection granted to airline passengers. The DHS as well as other 
agencies sharing its data were given exemptions from allowing access to data held on “entry 
processes”, which includes PNR data (Statewatch, 2007a). 
The evaluation of the 2006 interim instrument and the 2007 Agreement together with the 
surrounding negotiations definitely confirms the impression that at the least with the annulment 
of the 2004 Agreement in May 2006, the EU has lost considerable momentum in steering PNR 
discussions with the US. It seems as if a number of solid negotiation positions based on privacy 
protection and the rule of law were given up, without any serious attempt to oppose the often 
one-sided US requests. And the hope is deceptive that the needs/desires of the US will be 
satisfied once and for all – as the discussion under the following section shows. 
3.3.4  A new generation of PNR commitments: Bilateral arrangements 
between the US and certain member states 
Starting in early 2008, additional US security needs were invoked on yet another front, i.e. 
towards EU member states not yet part of the visa-free travel arrangements with the US. These 
included the new member states of the 2004 accession, mainly from Eastern Europe, as well as 
Greece. 
In return for providing the US with concessions that were not covered by the EU–US 
Agreement, the member states were offered prospects of becoming part of the VWP. This 
involved the fulfilment of multiple conditions in terms of cooperation with the US, such as 
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2007 requirements (e.g. regarding passengers not landing in but flying over the US and non-
travellers – for example family members – who are allowed beyond departure barriers to help 
elderly, young or ill passengers to board aircraft flying to America). Furthermore, the countries 
concerned would have to accept the ETA system requiring all travellers to apply online for 
permission to travel to the US before they could buy a ticket (Traynor, 2008). 
This move quite naturally conflicted with EU policy interests in both visa and PNR matters, 
which were based on a concept of a single negotiation approach with the US (see Box 6). All the 
warnings by the Commission that member states should avoid weakening the EU bargaining 
position were in vain, however: the Czech Republic acting as a forerunner (“Trojan horse”)
169 
signed the proposed MoU
170 on 26 February while others followed in the weeks after (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia).
171 
Box 6. The antecedents 
The solo advance by the 2004 newcomers, although widely viewed as an act contrary to solidarity did 
not occur without reason, though. Since their accession, visa-free travel especially to the US had been 
among their primary policy goals; not only as a matter of prestige to be at the same level as the old 
member states but also because of the diaspora communities in the US.  
Despite numerous complaints and despite the principle of solidarity prevailing in visa matters,
† the 
EU institutions did not act energetically enough to defend the interests of the new member states. 
“There was no help, no solidarity from Brussels” (Traynor, 2008); instead, the newcomers were even 
“urged” not to lodge a formal notification in the sense of Regulation (EC) No. 851/2005, which 
would have triggered a reciprocity mechanism and ultimately led to the “temporary restoration of the 
visa requirement for the citizens of the third country concerned”. In the case of the US, several of the 
old member states would not have been ready for such retaliation – “not least for fear of the massive 
disruption given the huge volume of transatlantic traffic” (ibid.). 
† See Council of the European Union (2005), Regulation (EC) No. 851/2005. 
 
In terms of a compromise, Brussels resolved the issue by letting the member states strike a deal 
with the US on ‘minor’ issues such as the sky marshals and national data exchange, whereas the 
Commission will remain in charge of the ETA issue (Goldirova, 2008). 
Notwithstanding this temporary relief, prospects of a satisfactory solution remain modest and 
one might again think of a Pyrrhic victory for all the parties involved.  
With the MoU signed, the new member states have entered into considerable obligations without 
obtaining a definite guarantee that they will soon benefit from visa-free travel. On the contrary, 
they will be exposed to practically permanent scrutiny by the DHS as to whether they fulfil 
expectations in “carrying out the security commitments” (Czech Republic–US, 2008, s. A.2), in 
question. And once designated as a VWP country, the member state would have to undergo 
periodic examination at least on a biannual basis in order to retain the status (s. A.2 of the MoU 
of 26 February 2008). In addition, what these countries might gain by fulfilling the conditions 
will not be the old style visa-free travel any more, but be subject to the ETA requirement that 
many consider just “a visa in disguise” (Goldirova, 2008). 
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For the EU, the situation implies a considerable loss of bargaining power in all related 
negotiations with the US; the possible ‘coalition’ between the US and individual member states 
in counteracting certain EU positions will always be pending as the sword of Damocles over 
forthcoming transatlantic talks such as the ETA/VWP issue and, of course, the PNR matters that 
are far from being resolved. 
In view of the meagre results recently obtained and the visibly decreasing ability to achieve 
acknowledged privacy standards, in transatlantic negotiations one should dare to ask the basic 
question of what needs to be done in order to get back on track. Without going into the details, 
there is primarily one aspect that seems to have unbalanced the negotiation concept.  
It is apparently not a problem of well-taken arguments: these have been sufficiently well 
presented with the help of the data protection authorities. If this reasoning – in contrast with the 
negotiations with Canada – did not manage to substantially influence the text finally agreed, this 
result had apparently to do with the entirely different importance attributed to privacy protection 
in the US, at least as long it may conflict with the interests of national security. And secondly, it 
appears that the US delegation is always able to put a much higher weight behind its bargaining 
position: such weight is not based on external elements of pressure but the attitude convincingly 
conveyed that they do not need the agreement.  
This situation leads to the further question of why EU delegations constantly convey the 
opposite attitude, that Europe could not live without such an agreement – no matter how 
unfavourable the conditions under which it is concluded. This unbalanced scenario occurs not 
only in PNR negotiations but also in visa and other travel-related discussions. And it is quite 
likely to reappear in the forthcoming ETA negotiations. As a first consideration, one should 
enquire why – instead of suffering from endless concessions – Europe could not equally 
envisage a situation without an agreement. Or in visa waiver/ETA discussions, one might 
consider retaliating by similarly introducing a visa requirement for US citizens. Is it too daring 
an assumption to suppose that Americans would suffer as much from such a situation as 
Europeans?  
In the end, one could expect that US delegations, when face to face with more determined 
European counterparts, would rather go for a reasonable compromise than extend the fighting 
forever.  
A change of approach is urgently needed since the US seems quite decided to take the argument 
up to the next level by challenging the principle of data protection as such. According to the 
DHS Deputy Assistant Paul Rosenzweig, the “EU should reconsider its decision to apply notions 
of adequacy to the critical area of law enforcement and public safety. Otherwise the EU runs the 
very real risk of turning itself into a self-imposed island, isolated from the very allies it needs.” 
This criticism is in first place addressed to the draft Framework Decision on data protection in 
police and criminal matters, since it “seeks to apply the same tired, failed standards of adequacy 
that it has applied in its commercial laws”.
172 
4.  Feasibility check: Do PNR instruments truly increase public security? 
As we have seen in the previous sections, PNR data are but a small wheel in the overall 
machinery of border protection. By itself, PNR processing is worth nothing, as it is not even 
capable of achieving the most modest operational success; still, governments are ready to pay a 
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high price in terms of delicate intrusions into fundamental rights and possible international 
complications in order to take advantage of this ‘small but precious pearl’ for improving public 
security. 
It is the intention of this short excursion into the field of border security to test the extent to 
which this precious element effectively adds to the overall efficiency of entry–exit systems or 
whether its deployment is compromised by other weak links in the chain. 
Just for recollection, aside from making associations between known and unknown people, the 
main purpose of the PNR is to contribute to a more precise risk profiling and targeting of 
suspects;
173 according to the profiles, established border services can allocate their resources to 
specific hotspots on the border. Furthermore, the processing of PNR data is conceived to ensure 
seamless entry–exit controls through an improved coverage of all cross-border travel 
movements.  
4.1  PNR and border-related securitisation: The direct impact  
Evidence on direct hits achieved by PNR processing is extremely thin. It is understandable that 
governments, when asked to provide evidence on the value of PNR collection, are getting into 
difficulties. This has first to do with the ancillary character of this kind of data but also with the 
secrecy involved in the matching, targeting and other operations performed behind the scenes. 
The EU Committee of the UK House of Lords, when conducting a hearing on “The positive 
value of PNR” in March 2007, obtained several statements in that regard (see Box 7). 
While expressing full understanding for the secrecy surrounding the highly sensitive area of 
national security, the House of Lords nevertheless regretted that it had to base its assessment 
more or less on hearsay evidence. Testimonies could have been given at least in a closed session, 
as it is an “important principle of democratic accountability that Parliament should be able to 
reach its own conclusions, and not have to rely on statements from the executive. This would 
help to secure public confidence” (UK Parliament, House of Lords, 2007, s. 22). 
Box 7. Statements made to the UK Parliament House of Lords 
According to Baroness Ashton of Upholland of the UK Department for Constitutional Affairs, there 
were a number of valuable examples of the benefits of PNR profiling in the areas of human 
trafficking and drug-smuggling operations, but no case could be cited regarding the fight against 
terrorism. 
Jonathan Faull of the European Commission (DG Justice, Liberty, Security) mentioned several cases 
regarding terrorism and serious crime reported to him by the American partners, although sometimes 
only in outline, which proved the benefits of the PNR. But these findings were “very highly 
confidential” and could thus not be described in detail. 
Similarly, Michael Chertoff, US Secretary of Homeland Security, when addressing various EU 
institutions in April and May 2007 made public, although “on an anonymous basis”, some of the 
security achievements that resulted from data collected from the PNR, while giving examples of how 
the analysis of PNR data had prevented dangerous individuals from entering the US. Yet only one of 
the eight cases cited concerned the prevention of terrorism. 
Source: UK Parliament, House of Lords (2007), ss. 19–21. 
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4.2  What can go wrong: Collateral damages caused by data processing 
Although assuming that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one should accept that PNR 
data constitute a valuable weapon in the fight against terrorism and serious crime, the EU 
Committee also examined cases that had gone wrong. Alongside the widely known example of 
Senator Edward Kennedy being stopped several times at US airports because of a mismatch with 
an entry on a no-fly list,
174 there has been the tragic example of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen 
of Syrian origin who spent almost a year in a Syrian prison cell owing to false conclusions 
drawn from correct PNR data by US and Canadian enforcement authorities.
175 
Such regrettable errors in terms of ‘false positives’ may arise from the bad quality of the original 
PNR record (e.g. misspelled names), but more frequently from careless management of watch 
lists or no-fly lists against which PNR data are matched.
176 The same applies to situations in 
which too many authorities are involved in the use/processing of the data or where system 
changes occur rather frequently. 
With regard to our Canada-related topic, it should be noted that errors of the above kind are far 
more frequent under the US system with its swift sequence of newly tested screening or 
targeting devices, growing number of watch lists as well as rapidly rising number of agencies 
with access to the data in question. The more conservative Canadian approach with its a single 
data system (PAXIS) and less frequent changes in technical and policy matters appears less 
vulnerable to such incidents. 
4.3  PNR and the concepts of seamless border protection 
In its early days, API/PNR processing had been conceived as a method to ensure a seamless 
control of entry–exit movements, in particular in view of detecting visa over-stayers. Since then, 
the concept of complete control has not just survived the 9/11 events, it has gained additional 
momentum from the new counter-terrorist purposes under which the knowledge of ‘who’s in and 
who’s out’ has attained a still greater importance. Accordingly, the enormous efforts undertaken 
in improving API/PNR mechanisms are often seen in the context of completing a gigantic entry–
exit system that will allow the tracing of movements and facilitate the pinpointing of suspects for 
easier apprehension. 
Yet, this vision seems to suffer from a series of technical/organisational difficulties that reduce 
DHS officials to sheer despair. This concerns notably the US-VISIT system with its mission of 
faultlessly recording entry and exit movements with the help of biometric data. While control 
systems at airports (thanks to partially automatic/self-service devices) have come close to 
perfection, the long land borders with Mexico and Canada remain the Achilles’ heel of the over-
ambitious project. 
Not much has changed since the conclusion drawn by the 9/11 Commission that “more than a 
half million persons enter the US illegally across the many thousand miles of land border every 
year”.
177 Attempts to secure the Mexican border by means of fences, including ‘virtual’ ones 
based on watchtowers, electronic detection devices and cameras, have not achieved the results 
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expected.
178 Also, the lakes and rivers between Canada and the US offer ideal opportunities for 
illicit crossings, especially if one mixes on a sunny day with Michigan’s thousands of 
recreational boaters on the Detroit River (Koslowski, 2005, p. 23). 
But loopholes are not only found on the ‘green’ and ‘blue’ stretches of the border, the heavily 
guarded and equipped ports of entry also prove vulnerable for various reasons (Koslowski, 
2005, p. 28): 
1)  The immense volume of approximately 330 million visa- and US-VISIT-exempt 
travellers per year (US and Canadian citizens, as well as Mexican citizens with border-
crossing cards) presents a perfect environment for unwanted foreigners (terrorist or others) 
to enter the US unrecognised and via official ports of entry.  
2)  The equally enormous volume of daily commuters of up to 150,000 entries and exits 
per day (San Ysidro/California–Mexico as well as Ambassador Bridge/Michigan–
Canada) impedes control measures of beyond 10-15 seconds per car in order to avoid a 
complete shutdown of the port. 
3)  The  incapacity of technical devices, including those working on the basis of radio 
technology or biometrics to ensure identity verification of every passenger is another 
weakness. There are easy ways to ‘fool’ radio-frequency identification border systems
179 
as well as digital fingerprint devices (e.g. through ‘fake fingers’).
180 
The overall construction of such an integrated entry–exit system is extremely complex; beyond 
advanced technology, it also involves significant investment in the physical border 
infrastructure. Experts emphasise that the drive for 100% completion of the system and 
associated decisions are finally yet importantly budgetary ones. Are the president and Congress 
willing to expend sufficient financial and political capital to overcome these barriers? (See 
Koslowski, 2005, p. 63.) 
These lessons should be kept in mind wherever else, Canada as well as the EU, the introduction 
of integrated border systems is being considered, whereby such advice applies to the overall 
system as well as individual components, including – as in our case – the highly sophisticated 
exploitation of passenger data. What is the benefit of investing dearly in a specific link of the 
chain if other parts will not fulfil the expectations? 
Conclusions 
As we have seen, the PNR is no more than a little though precious pearl among many on that 
long chain of elements called public security – even when looking at it solely through the narrow 
viewpoint of air traffic. It is more discrete than its straightforward colleagues such as API, 
which, thanks to its biographic data, can lead to direct hits and immediate implementation of no-
fly orders. PNR operates more covertly and it requires permanent exchange/matching with other 
sources to produce significant results – a feature that represents at the same time its strength and 
its vulnerability. 
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We have tried to present how, after almost 40 years of peaceful existence in civil aviation, the 
PNR was discovered for enforcement purposes and how this facilitation tool that was initially 
created to best accommodate the personal preferences of passengers eventually became a post-
9/11 device to track inclinations towards terrorist behaviour. Such a change of remit has implied 
several risks: a close neighbourhood with watch lists, targeting engines and other hardcore 
investigation devices, routine contact with a multitude of unconfirmed data and not least the 
natural risk of becoming itself the target of intense scrutiny by privacy watchdogs. Instead of 
enhancing civil liberties such as free movement, the PNR itself has suddenly become a threat to 
fundamental rights in terms of the data mining, mass processing and other deep intrusions into 
privacy. 
The PNR story has thereby not been an isolated event but one that fits perfectly with overall 
securitisation strategies (extra-territorial controls, biometric features, a comprehensive system of 
entry–exit controls, etc.)  which, besides tightening border security at home, have set up an 
extended border in order to keep possible offenders at the greatest possible distance away from 
territorial doorsteps. While transatlantic partners act increasingly in unison in this regard, a 
historic perspective reveals the extra-territorial aspect – as well as other strategies of massive 
border defences – as a specifically North American concept appropriate for common law 
countries, which traditionally reject the option of ID card-based controls within the territory. 
Continental Europeans, with their refined system of ID cards, would actually have much less 
reason to revert to such cumbersome strategies. The story of governmental intrusion being also 
one of resistance, we have equally looked at those who defend the civil liberties in question, 
identifying a number of fora at the parliamentary and judicial levels but most of all the DPAs, 
which do not all agree with the overall approach taken in PNR matters. 
When testing the EU–Canada Agreement and its legal compliance (acceptability) with accepted 
international standards of privacy protection such as the OECD guidelines and Art. 8 of the 
ECHR, it has emerged that this instrument justly deserves its reputation as an island of peace in 
troubled waters: aside from a few partial objections, the overall system has been extremely 
balanced and has granted citizens appropriate protection and means of redress in case of 
intrusion.  
Such judgment is all the more remarkable as it contrasts strongly with corresponding agreements 
concluded with the US. The EU–Canada instrument has shown an extremely low divergence rate 
from international standards (1.5 out 21), while the 2004 US Agreement failed to meet these 
benchmarks in more than two-thirds of the categories, including vital issues such as purpose 
limitation, transparency, proportionality, the retention period and appropriate citizens’ rights to 
access, rectification and redress. Instead of improving, this score even deteriorated for the 
subsequent Agreements of 2006 and 2007, mainly owing to US tendencies to further downplay 
the importance of privacy protection in favour of a still more determined fight/war against 
terrorism and related crime. 
The more prudent PNR approach chosen by the EU–Canada Agreement is also backed by 
considerations of practicability/feasibility and cost efficiency. Given that the most perfected 
front door devices in terms of airport entry control do not provide complete protection as long as 
the back door along land and sea borders remains wide open, especially to those who tend to 
disguise their movements, there does not seem much sense in investing too much – either 
monetarily or policy-wise.  
It is good to remember these considerations: owing to the sunset clauses that are typical of good 
privacy-related legislation, the EU–Canada Agreement is soon due for a complete overhaul. In 
view of the pro-security/contra-privacy tendencies currently visible even in Canada (e.g. the no-
fly provisions under the Passenger Protect Programme) and the EU (the future entry–exit 
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foreseen for the second half of 2008. It would be a pity if the EU–Canada instrument, instead of 
being a model for PNR legislation to come, were sacrificed to short-sighted enforcement 
considerations. 
Policy recommendations 
Based on the findings presented in this report, the following policy recommendations are put 
forward: 
•  The exploitation of PNR data for counter-terrorism purposes represents a highly sensitive 
matter that should be regulated with utmost care by the legislator.  
•  Decision-makers should be conscious of the quality of privacy as a fundamental right, 
which cannot be restricted or sacrificed for reasons of mere administrative/enforcement 
convenience. Any restriction must be carefully weighed in accordance with international 
data protection standards. 
•  As PNR data unfolds its potential for operational success as well as momentous errors in 
the framework of mass data processing and in combination with other data systems, 
regulatory bodies should set clear limits regarding 1) onward transfers to other agencies 
and 2) use of that data for purposes other than counter-terrorism. Onward transfers to other 
countries should be made dependant on the existence of adequate privacy standards in the 
destination country (adequacy finding). 
•  Any review or further extension of the PNR system should be preceded by a thorough 
analysis of the benefits that the measures are allegedly expected to produce. The argument 
of an increase in border security in general should thus be met with specific scepticism: as 
long as countries do not sufficiently master the control/surveillance of their notoriously 
porous land and water borders, a unilateral increase of airport and air traffic security is 
unlikely to produce any relevant results. 
•  Countries should abstain from adequacy findings based on mere assurances by PNR 
beneficiary countries. They should be ready to suspend further PNR transfers when there 
are reasonable doubts concerning the adequacy of protection. 
•  The 2006 EU–Canada Agreement represents an instrument beyond (almost) all criticism; 
forthcoming review talks should definitely seek to extend the validity of its existing 
provisions rather than aligning them with the doubtful standards of other recent 
instruments. 
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List of Abbreviations 
API  Advance passenger information  
APIS  Advance passenger information system 
APP  Advance passenger processing 
Article 29 Working Party  Data Protection Working Party under Art. 29  
of Directive 95/46/EC 
ATS  Automated Targeting System (US) 
ATSC  Air travellers security charge (Canada) 
CAPPS  Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (US) 
CBC  Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
CBP  Customs and Border Protection (US) 
CBSA  Canada Border Services Agency 
CIPPIC  Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic 
CLASS  Consular Lookout and Support System (US) 
CRS  Computer reservation system 
CSI  Container Security Initiative 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security (US) 
DPAs  Data protection authorities 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights and  
Fundamental Freedoms 
EDPS  European Data Protection Supervisor 
EPIC  Electronic Privacy Information Centre 
ETA  Electronic travel authorisation 
EURODAC  System for the comparison of fingerprints of asylum 
applicants (EU) 
FAITC  Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 
GDSs  Global distribution systems 
IATA  International Air Transport Association 
IBIS  Interagency Border Inspection System (US) 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IDENT  Automated Biometric Identification System (US) 
IRPA  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Canada) 
IRRI  International Refugee Rights Initiative 
ISE  Information sharing environment 
MoU  Memorandum of understanding 
NCIC  National Crime Information Center (US) 
NGOs Non-governmental  organisations 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OPC  Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada TRACING TERRORISTS: THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT IN PNR MATTERS | 57 
 
OSI  Other service information 
PAXIS  Passenger Information System (Canada) 
PIPEDA Personal  Information  Protection and Electronic  
Documents Act (2000) (Canada) 
PNR  Passenger name record 
RFID Radio  frequency  identification 
SABRE  Semi-Automatic Business Research Environment 
SIS  Schengen Information System (EU) 
SSR  Special service request 
TSA  Transportation Security Administration (US) 
VIS  Visa Information System (EU) 
VWP  Visa Waiver Program (US) 
WMDs  Weapons of mass destruction  
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Table AII.1 cont. 
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17. Date of ticket issuance  17. E-mail address  17. General remarks including 
OSI, SSI and SSR information 
18. No show history  18. Ticketing field information  18. Any collected APIS 
information 
19. Bag tag numbers  19. General remarks  19. All historical changes to the 
PNR listed in numbers 1 to 18 
20. Go show information  20. Ticket number   
21. Seat information  21. Seat number   
22. One-way tickets  22. Date of ticket issuance   
23. Any collected APIS 
information 
23. No show history   
24. Standby  24. Bag tag numbers   
25. Order at check in  25. Go show information   
 26.  OSI  information   
  27. SSI/SSR information   
  28. Received from information   
  29. All historical changes to the 
PNR 
 
  30. Number of travellers on 
PNR 
 
  31. Seat information   
 32.  One-way  tickets   
  33. Any collected APIS 
information 
 
  34. Automated ticket fare quote 
fields 
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